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I. INTRODUCTION
The common expression, "you should have known better," used in
judicial opinions and everyday speech, is often employed in a context that
implies either that the faulted person deserves a sanction when others
would not, or that she deserves a more severe sanction than others. This
may be called the "knowledge-proposition." The expression is used.to
make various points, including the point that the antisocial or illegal
consequences of a particular act are so obvious that everyone, or at least
everyone in the position of the actor, should have foreseen them, and
therefore the actor, though personally ignorant, is not excused from
responsibility.' The expression is also used in the sense that the actor
should have been aware that the chosen act runs contrary to her own
interests.2 But the more interesting uses of the expression suggest that,
because the actor should have been aware of the antisocial or illegal
consequences of her act, by choosing to act nevertheless, she acted
reprehensibly in circumstances in which we would not blame others at all,
or she acted more reprehensibly than we would judge others to have acted.3
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., 1966, University of Michigan. The author is grateful
to Claire Finkelstein, Larry Solan, and Spencer Weber Waller for constructive comments on prior
drafts. A summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School supported this endeavor.
I. This has been referred to as a state of"voluntary ignorance." See JAMES S. FISHKIN, TYRANNY
AND LEGITIMACY: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL THEORIES 47 (1979). Examples Fishkin cites are "a
ship's pilot (who should have known about certain navigational obstacles) and a cook (who should
have known that salt was necessary for the potatoes)." /d. (citing G.E.M. Anscombe, The Two Kinds
of Error in Action, in ETHICS 279, 287 (Judith J. Thomson & Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968)).
2. At one point Feinberg hints at this use: "Some eccentrically imprudent behavior may not be
'voluntarily unreasonable' not because, being unreasonable it cannot be voluntary, but rather because,
dangerous though it may be, it is not truly unreasonable in relation to the actors own interests." JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF I ll (1986). In characterizing such conduct as unreason4ble, one must be
careful to refrain from importing one's own goals. See id. at 11-12.
3. Notice that the proposition can be construed to align with Holmes's accepted view that a
person is liable for damages that would have been foreseen by a reasonable person, irrespective of what
the actor actually foresaw. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 117 (Mark D. Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (arguing a person "is bound to foresee whatever a prudent and
intelligent man would have foreseen, and therefore he is liable for conduct from which such a man
would have foreseen that harm was liable to follow"); see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the
Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985) ("We cannot even begin to argue about most issues
of responsibility and liability without first asking what a hypothetical reasonable person would do
under the circumstances."). But see H. L.A. HART, Diamonds and String: Hohnes on the Coinon Law,
in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278,284 (1983) (arguing that, in the criminal context,
there is little American legal support for the refusal to examine actual foresight). If we ascribe to
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In this second permutation, the actor is not simply blameworthy; she is
more blameworthy because she should have known better.4 It is these latter
two uses that are examined in this Article.
An individual's perceived character, as well as the varying
circumstances in which she acts, often affects social judgments of her
responsibility and blameworthiness.' Often, particular circumstances lead
to judgments of diminished responsibility.' For example, the various legal
disabilities, such as infancy and mental incompetence, sometimes result in
Holmes's reasonable person not simply the knowledge and qualities of Everyperson. but the presumed
additional knowledge and qualities of the actual actor, then not only are we basing general liability on
the standard of this special reasonable person, but we are also adding heightened accountability: "But
ifa person in fact has knowledge, skill, oreven intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the
law will demand of that person conduct consistent with it." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 185 (5th ed. 1984). Rawls observes that "a reasonable man knows,
or tries to know, his own emotional, intellectual, and moral predilections and makes a conscientious
effort to take them into account in weighing the merits of any question." John Rawls, Outline ofa
Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177, 179 (1951).
4. A sensational(ized) example was reported in the newspaper:
The crime drew widespread attention, not only for its callous nature, but also because [the
detendant], who said he hoped to become a dentist, had no criminal record and was the
promising son of hard-working, middle-class parents. But the Rockland County District
Attorney ., . said today that, if anything, [the defendant's] background should be held
against him. "He was privileged to receive the best that our society has to offer," [the
District Attorney] said, but added that he made a "mockery" of the opportunities he
received.
Julia Campbell, Ex-Student Is Sentenced to 70 Years to Lije in Fatal Caijacking in Rockland, N.Y.
TtMES, Feb. I, 1995, at B5.
5. Goodin finds that "[tlhe standard model of'responsibility (championed variously by lawyers,
churchmen and Kantian philosophers) is essentially a mechanism for fixing credit or, more commonly.
blame for certain sorts of'states ofaftairs.... People are paradigmatically held responsible for flaws
in their characters and for the outcomes (especially the harms) that flow from them." Robert E.
Goodin, Apportioning Responsibilities, 6 LAW & PHIL. 167, 167-68 (1987). On the other hand, Miller
argues that "[tlo be responsible for something is to be answerable for it; it is not necessarily to be
blamable." David Miller, Reply to Oppenheim, 95 ETHICS 310, 313 (1985). "Responsibility, one
might say, opens the door to questions of praise and blame without deciding them." Id. The question
of responsibility, then, is strongly normative, not factual. See JOEL FEINBERG, Problematic
Responsibiliy in Law and Morals, in DOING AND DESERVING 25, 27 (1970) ("In problematic cases
... legal responsibility is something to be decided, not simply discovered."). "[Riesponsibility is but
a set ofpractices that we use to describe and understand individual and social behavior. Responsibility
matters are matters that enter into our daily lives in myriad ways that cannot be reduced to simple
formulas and principles." PETER A. FRENCH. RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS at ix-x (1992). "[Tlhe central
core of the concept of responsibility is that I can be asked the question 'Why did you do it?' and be
obliged to give an answer." J.R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1993). "To be responsible is to be able
to make a response." FRENCH, supra, at 16. For the various meanings of ascribing responsibility, see
JOEL FEINBERG, Action and Responsibility, in DOING AND DESERVING, supra, at 119, 130-34; Meir
Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries ofthe Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959,962-65 (1992); and
Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibiityfor Human Suffering: Awareness. Participation. and the Frontiers
of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 472-83 (1993) (proposing two models of responsibility).
6. See, e.g., TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 20 (1969) ("We
recognise a considerable range of'conditions which may reduce a man's responsibility for a particular
action.").
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reduced duties of care.7 Also, while it is said that "ignorance of the law is
no excuse," lack of legal knowledge often induces courts to excuse
behavior at least partially, particularly when relatively innocent third
parties are not harmed by the ignorant conduct.' Various rationales and
extenuating circumstances that excuse the ignorance are recognized
throughout the law.9 But the expression examined in this Article, "you
should have known better," suggests moral and legal pressure in the
opposite direction: toward heightened accountability. "' It is the aim of this
7. Wolffoffers an explanation. Children are less responsible because they "do not yet possess
the power of reason in a developed form," while mental incompetents "are thought to lack freedom of
choice." ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 12 (1970). "1W je Should assign a greater
degree of responsibility to children, for madmen, by virtue of their lack of free will, are completely
without responsibility, while children, insofar as they possess reason in a partially developed form, can
be held responsible ... to a corresponding degree." hi. at 12-13. Wolff' fails to note that the law
recognizes both cognitive and volitional mental incompetency. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF
CONTRACTS § 15 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.6 (3d ed. 19991.
8. For example, the traditional rule in retreat is that one cannot claim reliance oti a misrep-
resentation of law because every person is presumed to know the law. See KEETON ET AL., supra note
3, at 758-60. Reid justifies compassion for some ignorant persons: "[T]he unlearned man, who uses
the best means in his power to know his duty, and acts according to his knowledge, is inculpable in
the sight of God and man. He may err, but he is not guilty of immorality." Thomas Reid, Ofthe First
Principles of Morals, reprinted in MORALS AND VALUES 63, 70 (Marcus G. Singer ed., Charles
Scribner's Sons 1977) (1788). Fletcher captures Reid's idea in "the distinction between wrongdoing
and responsibility, the wrong of'violating the norm and the blameworthiness of not controlling one's
actions and abstaining from the violation [though one is ignorant of the lawI." George P. Fletcher,
Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263. 1271 (1985). In general, "'Ithere is some
support in legal usage for regarding acts done in ignorance or by mistake as less than fully voluntary."
H.I,.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 138 n.40 (2d ed. 1985). The criminal law,
however, is reluctant to recognize ignorance of the law as any excuse because "the criminal law
represents certain moral principles, [and) to recognize ignorance or mistake of the law as a delense
would contradict those values." ,lerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law. 33 IND. Li.
I, 20 (1957). Nevertheless, "the maxim [that ignorance of the law is no excuse], far from being an
exhaustive statement of the law, is in reality a mere starting point for a complex set of contliciing
standards and considerations that allow courts to avoid many of'the harsh results that strict adherence
to the maxim would entail." Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rle.s and Conduct Ride.s': Oi Acoustic
Separation in Cri,inal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646 (1984). Some of the considerations for the
retreat of the traditional rule must certainly be rooted in realistic pragmatism: "Both American and
foreign studies show (not surprisingly) that modern populations know abysmally little aboiut law and
legal systems." Lawrence M. Friedman, Law. Lawyers, and Popular Culure. 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1593
(1989) (footnote omitted).
9. See, e.g.. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.14, at 258-59; GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW § 10, 759-875 (1978); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 758-60.
10. Perhaps it is not direct pressure toward heightened accountability of the knowing actor that
is at work, but rather relaxation of the social compunctions about holding him accountable: "Infliction
of punishment is an intrinsic evil, but it is less of an evil when the person brings it on himself.... We
are less impressed with his loss when he could and should have avoided it." Vinit Haksar, Evcu',es and
Vohntary Conduct, 96 ETHICS 317, 325 (1986). Haksar relies on "a general rationale that explains
why the voluntary element is important for both rewards and penalties." /d. at 324.
Left aside is the person who consciously "does know better" but nevertheless chooses the illegal
act because of perceived higher principle. This person may also be punished more severely but for
different, deterrent reasons: "A man's high motives may sometimes be a reason for not punishing hihn
2000]
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Article to unpack this thrust of the proposition. I begin with a general
explication of the relationship between knowledge and responsibility.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE PROPOSITION
Basic knowledge and information are requisites to rational choice. As
apparent in a representative definition of "rational action," knowledge is
said to inhere in all the elements of rationality: "Rational action . . .
involves three optimizing operations: finding the best action, for given
beliefs and desires; forming the best-grounded belief, for given evidence;
and collecting the right amount of evidence, for given desires and prior
beliefs."'
Rational choice is generally a requisite to moral and legal respon-
sibility. One representative analysis of "responsibility" reveals where
rationality fits: "' [R]esponsibility' has two primary meanings, or ... what
[J. Roland Pennock] has called the core of meaning has two facets, (a)
accountability and (b) the rational and moral exercise of discretionary
power (or the capacity or disposition for such exercise), and that each of
these notions tends to flavor the other."' 2
at all; but in other cases they may be a reason for punishing him as severely as the law allows. For the
conscientious offender may be the stubbomest of all: his scruples may be far less easily overbone by
threats of punishment than more selfish motives." S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POI.1TI' AL THOUGHT 224(1959). Along these lines, Bentham clains that unusual temptation is ground
not for mitigating the penalty but rather for increasing it to overcome the temptation. See JEREMY
BENTIHAM, AN INTRODU'CTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166-68 (J.H. Burns
& H.L..A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
1I. JON ELSTER, SOLOMONICJLIDGMENTS 4 (1989). Anthony Downs states it this way: "To make
rational decisions, a man must know (1) what his goals are, (2) what alternative ways of reaching these
goals are open to him, and (3) the probable c9nsequences ofehoosing each alternative. Tle knowledge
he requires is contextual knowledge as well as information...." ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 208 (1957); see also ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 64
(1993) ("Two themes permeate the philosophical literature. First, that rationality is a matter of reasons
.... Second, that rationality is a matter of reliability."); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS. A THEORY OF
REASONS FOR ACTION 15 (1971) ("[To say of a person that he has the concept of rationality is to say
that he has certain special capacities ofjudgement, thought, belier: and knowledge .... ). Downs
continLies: "Even choosing goals requires information, since only his ultimate goal-. his picture of the
ideal social state-exists independent [sic] of his knowledge of the current situation." DOWNS, supia,
at 208. The term "rational choice," however, has various meanings. See. e.g., John Finnis, Natural
Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 134, 140-41 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). The
word "rational" has been said to be "a chameleon among words." Donald H. Regan, The Problem of
Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 429 (1972). For an overview of rational choice theory,
see Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE I (Jon Elster ed., 1986). For an overview of
rationality in general, see FREDERICSCHICK, HAVING REASONS 37-65 (1984); and Steven Lukes, Some
Problenis About Rationality, in RATIONALITY 194 (Bryan R. Wilson ed., 1970).
12. J. Roland Pennock, The Problem of ResponsibiliOY, in RESPONSIBILITrY 3, 13 (Carl J.
Friedrich ed., 1960); see also Jules L. Coleman, Justice and the Argunent.fior No-Fauh, 3 SOC.
THEORY& PRAC. 161 ,170 (1974)("Beitigat fault, morally orotherwise, has twoessential ingredients.
[Vol. 48
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Because knowledge is a requisite to rationality and, therefore,
responsibility,'3 the interesting aspect of the knowledge proposition "you
should have known better" suggests that the accused person is charged with
knowledge beyond the minimum required for moral and legal censure. The
proposition is not advanced against the accused whenever responsibility is
assigned to her, but it is resorted to when she denies, explicitly or
implicitly, responsibility on the grounds of ignorance ("How was I to know
that overloading my truck would lead to this mishap'?"), or it is raised as a
justification for a sanction more severe than usual ("I impose on you the
maximum fine because, as an experienced, professional trucker, you should
have known of the risk of this mishap from overloading."). With the
knowledge proposition thus situated in common parlance, I now turn to
what it implies.
These examples regarding the trucker reveal that there are two relevant
uses of the knowledge proposition. The first use, which may be called the
responsibility claim, asserts that the knowledgeable actor should be liable
when an unknowledgeable actor should not be. Interestingly, in some
respects, this reverses what Kant, Hart, Rawls and others have called the
One element in fault judgments relates to the character of the act and its relationship to the appropriate
standard of conduct, while the other relates to the actor's 'state of mind."'). Finkelstein emphasizes
the first element, the moral accountability of "responsibility": "We often say someone is not
'responsible' for an occurrence, when what we mean is that, although she brought it about on purpose,
she is not to blame." Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account ofthe Defense in Law,
37 ARiz. L. REV. 251, 271 (1995). Finkelstein does not, however, lose sight ofthe second element:
"[tlhe action must be something the agent did for a reason in order for the agent to be responsible for
it." hi. at 278. Ladd emphasizes the second element, the exercise of discretionary power: "The
common element in almost all, if not all, of the morally relevant senses of 'responsibility' is the stress
on the 'forethought, care, intelligence, and initiative' demanded of the actor who is the subject of
responsibility." John Ladd, The Ethics of Participation, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 98, 112 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975) (quoting Kurt Baier, Responsibility and Action,
reprinted in THE NATURE OF HUMAN ACTIONS 104 (Myles Brand, ed. 1970)). Connolly identi fies-the
generally agreed upon elements by noting "that any agents capable of forming intentions, of
deliberately shaping their conduct to rules, of appreciating the significance of their actions for others,
and of exercising self-restraint are the sorts of agents worthy of being held responsible tor conduct that
fails to live up to expected standards." WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
193 (3d ed. 1993).
13. Holmes writes that "the choice [to act] must be made with a chance of contemplating the
consequence complained of, or else it has no bearing on responsibility for that consequence."
HOLMES, supra note 3, at 46. Likewise, Moore states:
Whatever else the principle of responsibility might include, it should include the power or
ability to appraise the moral worth of one's proposed actions. A person has such ability
only if he has moral and factual knowledge of what he is doing and is able to integrate the
two to perceive the moral quality of his action.
MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 342 (1984). This general view is not new: "[111I some
cases ignorantiafacti doth excuse, for such an ignorance many times makes the act itself morally
involuntary." SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OFTHECROWN 42 (1736), qioted in HERBERT FINGARETTE
& ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBII.,TY 47 (1979).
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key principle of responsibility: "ought" implies "can."' 4  Behind the
responsibility claim is the principle "can" implies "ought" in the sense that,
insofar as one can be aware of the normative consequences of an action
when others cannot, one ought to be responsible for it when others ought
not. 5 The second use of the knowledge proposition, which may be called
the remedy claim, asserts that the knowledgeable actor should be subject
to a greater sanction or liability than that of the unknowledgeable actor.
Before turning to the underlying postulates of the knowledge
proposition, notice that the responsibility and remedy claims align with the
doctrine of punitive damages. A choice to act when one knows or should
know that another person, without consent, is put at substantial risk may be
described as not simply blameworthy. At some point, it would be
characterized as the deliberate and willful choice to harm another person,
which smacks of malice. While such a deliberate and willful choice may
not be malicious in the sense of spitefulness or viciousness, such as when,
with cold indifference, the actor deliberately and willfully harms another
person, still the law of most states identifies such deliberate and willful
behavior as sufficiently malicious or outrageous to grant punitive
damages.'6 In the words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, punitive
damages are allowed "for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others." 7 Behavior this reprehensible supports the social judgment that the
quasi-criminal sanction of punitive damages is warranted. This parallels
the responsibility claim. Finally, granting relief under the law of punitive
damages, pursuant to their retributive, rather than deterrent purposes,
14. See William K. Frankena, Obligation and Abilitr, in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 148, 157
(Max Black ed., 1950) ("[Mlany moral philosophers ... say, in one way or another, that 'ought'
implies 'can.' Indeed, if there is anything on which philosophers are agreed with plain men and with
each other, and goodness knows there is very little, it is Kant's dictum, 'Dit kannst, denn dit sollst");
see also MOORE, supra note 13, at 341 ("John Rawls, following Hart, regards ["ought" implies "can"l
as the principle ofresponsibility fiom which more particular principles, such as those requiring actions,
intentions, or reasons. may be derived.") (citing H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of
Responsibiliy, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 158, 177 (1968) and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OFJUSTICE § 38(1971)). See generally ALAN R. WHITE, MODAL THINKING 147-57(1975) (disc ussing
the modal verbs "ought" and "can").
15. That "can" implies "ought," at least in an attenuated sense, suggests other moral, legal and
economic principles, such as when the occasional duty to disclose arises because one party has material
information unknown to the other party, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.11, at 246-49, or when
the duty to avoid a risk is imposed on the party with the best information on how to accomplish the
task most efficiently, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-73 (1970).
16. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205-07 (1973); KEETON ET AL.. supra note
3, § 2, at 9-10 ("There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or
a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.").
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977).
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parallels the remedy claim: the more reprehensible the conduct, the higher
the granted damages. 8
III. THE UNDERLYING POSTULATES
As adumbrated in the discussion of the moral justification of the
responsibility and remedy claims, I contend that implicit in the knowledge
proposition are four related postulates, which may be called the channel,
incentive, disposition, and accountability postulates. To provide an
overview of the weaving road to follow, here is a brief description of those
postulates. The channel postulate is that the more one's conduct is guided
along the "straight and narrow," against an antisocial or illegal act, the
more one "knows better" than to act improperly. The incentive postulate
is that choice is channeled by conflict with, and inducement from, one's
preferences and values, as well as society's sanctions. The disposition
postulate is that the more one's choice is channeled against an improper
act, the more one must deliberately and willfully resist the guidance (or the
greater must be the character defect) to choose it. Finally, the account-
ability postulate is that the more one deliberately and willfully chooses an
improper act, or the more it is the product of one's cultivated character
defect, the more one is blameworthy for so choosing.' 9 These four
underlying postulates are next elaborated in turn.
18. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 2, at 15. For an analysis and critique of the retributive
purposes of punitive damages, see Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive
Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1. 23-85 (1989).
19. For Hart's description of"four heads of classification" of the senses of the word "responsi-
bility," see H.L.A. HART, Postscript: ResponsibiliY and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 210,211-22. Michael Moore parses Hart's analysis into six senses
of retrospective responsibility, which represent an increasing scale, each sense having its own
condition of ascription:
Sense of "responsible ": Conditions of ascription:
I. Causally responsible Causation
2. Prospective responsibility Moral or legal duty
3. Responsible-accountable Accountable agent
4. Responsible-answerable Action and mental state
5. Responsible-culpable No justification or excuse
6. Responsible-liable Justification for imposition of sanctions met
MOORE, supra note 13, at 51. Thus, Moore agrees that "we hold people retrospectively responsible
in law or morals only if they are accountable agents who negligently or intentionally, and without
justification or excuse, perform actions that cause some state of'affairs they were obligated not to bring
about." Id. at 51-52; see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 192-93 (1977)
(parsing Hart's analysis of responsibility into four categories); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and
the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1583-88 (1980) (providing additional parsing of Hart's
analysis); Susan Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
267, 275-79 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (describing three senses of
"responsibility": causal, moral, and practical).
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A. The Channel Postulate
Under the channel postulate, the more one's conduct is guided against
an antisocial or illegal act, the more one "knows better" than to perform
it.20 As excavators of the channel, there appear to be two classes of the
relevant knowledge: fact and value. First, the prospective factual conse-
quences of the contemplated act must be, or should have been, apparent to
the chooser. Second, the normativity of the act, the extent to which it is
antisocial or illegal, should also be apparent.
First, the channel is excavated by a knowledge of the relevant facts.
Regarding a choice involving a recondite body of knowledge, such as
whether an unusual form of investment has the same special tax advantages
of related investments, the novice cannot be expected to be knowledgeable
and, therefore, aware of the impropriety of her tax claim. She may still be
liable despite her ignorance, but she need not suffer, unlike the tax lawyer,
increased sanctions on the basis that she should have known better.
The knowledge proposition also applies to more ordinary situations in
which it becomes evident that "knowing better" does not simply depend on
raw knowledge, because all competent persons, and perhaps most incompe-
tent ones, generally know not to commit antisocial and illegal acts and
know generally which acts fall within these categories. So "knowledge"
means something beyond simply being aware of, or being able to correctly
answer, an associated true or false quiz, such as whether the speed limit is
reduced in foul highway conditions, whether it is day or night, whether it
is blizzardy or sunny, and whether the road ahead is straight or curvy.
Even the lifelong Floridian knows this information when venturing out of
the state for the first time and driving into the wintery Rockies. But she
does not "really know."2' Life-long northem mountain dwellers, on the
20. Brandt's examination ofthe variables that influence a person's action align mainly with the
channel postulate. He finds there to be at least live variables:
( I ) his beliefs (possibly partly unconscious) about the options open to him; (2) his beliefs
about the situation he is in; (3) his beliefs about consequences that might occur if he takes
any one of these options and how strong they are (how likely he thinks the consequences
would be); (4) the vividness of his representation of these matters at the time; and (5) his
desires and aversions for these consequences (taking each action as being a consequence
of itself, so that an aversion just to doing something of a certain sort is included).
R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theoiyof Excuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, suipra note
19, at 165, 173. The fifth variable is more akin to the next postulate, the incentive postulate.
21. For example, regarding the failure of a person to use a seat belt despite knowledge of the
additional safety, Gerald Dworkin writes: "[Allthough I know in some intellectual sense what the
probabilities and risks are, I do not fully appreciate them in an emotionally genuine manner." Gerald
Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 78,92 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin
eds., 5th series 1979). Goodin, after quoting Dworkin, says the same of cigarette smokers. See
ROBERT E. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 49 (1982).
[Vol. 48
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other hand, "really know" and drive accordingly. To be burdened with full
moral censure for misfortunate consequences, one must "really know" in
some heightened sense that surpasses mere book or everyday knowledge
because we recognize that casual knowledge may not be enough to
sufficiently alert the agent to the repercussions of the impending choice.22
One must have special experience or socialization that particularly
highlights this knowledge and erects perceived barriers to nonresponsive
choices. 3 As in the distinction between an inadvertent act causing harm
and an intentional one, we find the intentional act more blameworthy, even
though, both acts being voluntary, we may ascribe responsibility to the
actor for either. -4
In making a considered, responsible choice, one must appreciate the
potential consequences of the existing facts, that is, their significance.-
Appreciating the consequences of a choice is not just a matter of knowing
the existing facts, including the overall context of the choice, though this
is a beginning. Making a choice based on anticipated consequences goes
beyond a deductive process from known information. Meaningful,
22. The proposition takes into account the following observation:
[W]e are hampered by inadequate powers of reasoning and judgment. Our capacity to perceive
and to remember is so limited, and the reliability and predictability of what we liam so uncertain,
that we are hindered from the very outset. And our ability to reason, to take the information,
such as it is, into account, and to arrive at judgments, is in itselfseverely limited and subject to
bias from all directions.
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 103-04 (1982).
23. Habits may cause the barriers to fall below the level of conscious perception, unless the
habits are challenged by unusual circumstances. See ALAN GEWIRTH. REASON AND MORALITY 38
(1978) ("The purposes for which persons act may be habitual, results of long-standing goal-directed
behavior where the goals have ceased to occupy the center of attention.... That they are still latently
present, however, would be shown if attempts were made to interfere with the agent's attaining
them.").
24. Fletcher finds inadvertent risk-taking to be "voluntary if, under the circumstances, the actor
could have realized the risks implicit in his conduct." FLETCHER, slpra note 9. § 9.2.3, at 711. "[Tlhe
conscious and intentional actor realizes at every moment that he might desist, whereas the mistaken
or inadvertent actor does not repeatedly forego the opportunity of correcting himself' This might
explain why intentional wrongdoing is regarded as more culpable than negligent wrongdoing ..
hi.
25. See HOLMES, supra note 3, at 47 ("Ignorance ofa fact and inability to foresee a consequence
have the same effect of [thwarting] blameworthiness."). To generalize. Murphy and Coleman identify
the normative elements ofan act: "Being at fault, morally or otherwise, has two essential ingredients.
One element in fault judgments relates to the character of the act and its relationship to the appropriate
standard of conduct, while the other relates to the actor's 'state ofmind.' JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW .181-82 (1984). Personal autonomy grounds a
justification for the requirement of awareness: "The prospect of responsibility for all-harm that results
from an individual's action, including injuries which she did not (or could not) anticipate, restricts her
autonomy insofar as it limits what she chooses to do for fear of unknown consequences." Lytton.
supra note 5, at 476-77.
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normatively loaded decisions also characteristically face risk and
uncertainty.
The emerging body of literature on choice under risk and uncertainty
distinguishes these two concepts in the following way: risk occurs when the
probabilities of eventualities are known; uncertainty occurs when the
probabilities are unknown. '6 Both concepts commonly enter into decisions
of any complexity. For example, in deciding whether to overload a truck,
one must estimate, among other things, the degree of the increased risk of
an accident from having less control over the vehicle and from the
reduction in its reliability, and one must incorporate many factors, such as
those relating to the uncertain highway conditions, that might be met.
Correctly incorporating this probabilistic incertitude is an endeavor fraught
with pitfalls. 7 People do not do it very well.
Cognitive psychologists have found many sources for the distortions
of decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty. 8 Some of these sources
stem from framing and heuristics. Framing distortions are cognitive
variations in perceptions owing to the particular circumstances.29 Both
26. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 13 (1957): Richard Zeck-
hauser. Cominiments: Behavioral Versus Rational Economics: What You See Is What You Conquer?: The
Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 251, 257 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987)
[hereinafter RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST) (discussing the "distinction between risk (where
probabilities are known) and uncertainty (where they are unknown)").
27. Von Magnus asserts that the factors favorable to making rational choices to engage in risky
behavior include "risk takers (I ) having good information about benefits, probabilities, and outcomes;
(2) having established patterns of probabilistic reasoning (planning and calculation); and (3) having
the ability to incorporate the conclusion of such deliberations into behavior controls." Eric Von
Magnus, Preference. Rationality, and Risk Taking, 94 ETHICS 637, 642 (1984). Though these three
conditions may be met only on rare occasions, "[a] fourth condition is called for: that there has been
some accumulated and reflective social experience with the kind of risk taking in question and that the
risk taker has had the opportunity to be influenced by it." Id. at 643.
28. For brief surveys of the types and causes of the en'ors that occur when making choices under
risk and uncertainty, see GOODIN, supra note 21, at 139-45. and Bailey Kuklin. The Asrnimetrical
Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 904-09 (1990). See
generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY]; RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); RATIONAL CHOICE: THE
CONTRAST, supra note 26. In speculating about the many factors that "warp the perception ol'risk,"
one commentator "hypothesize[s) that human beings possess Darwinian algorithms for risk perception
that are not logical but are nonetheless adaptive. Logic. truth, and rcality only matter to humans
insof'ar as they advance reproductive success." Peter Strahlendorl' Traditional Legal Conceptsfi-on
an Evolution-ao Perspective, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 128, 147 (Roger D. Mastcrs & Margaret Grulter
eds., 1992).
29. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 25 (1983) ("Preference change by framing occurs when the
relative attractiveness of options changes when the choice situation is refrained in a way that rationally
should make no difference."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Lnder Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 28, at 3, 8; Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, The Psychology ofP'references, 246 SC1. AM. 160, 168 (1982) ("The f'raming of a
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factual and normative judgments are affected.3 " For example, the
estimation of the risk and uncertainty of overloading a truck, and the
propriety of doing so, is influenced by whether one is being encouraged to
do so by one's entreating loved one, a disdainful neighbor, a taunting street
urchin, or a demanding, scar-faced stranger with a bulge in his coat pocket.
Heuristics are resorted to because humans are not strong reasoners in the
shadow of risk and uncertainty; we do not normally make probabilistic
estimations with scientific or mathematical sophistication. "A heuristic is
any guiding principle for transforming information to solve a problem or
to form a judgment."'" It is well established that heuristic estimations are
persistently warped in a variety of ways.32 For example, our trucker is
likely to overestimate the risk of overloading her truck if she recently had
an accident caused by overloading, or underestimate the risk if she has
never had or seen such an accident.
transaction can alter its attractiveness by controlling the costs and benefits that are assigned to its
account.); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,
in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST, supra note 26, at 67, 73 ("Framing is controlled by the manner
in which the choice problem is presented as well as by norms, habits, and expectancies of the decision
maker.").
30. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 22-27 (1081 ); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahne man, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, in RATIONA L CHOICE, supra note
11, at 123, 139 ("The framing of acts and outcomes can also reflect the acceptance or rejection of
responsibility for particular consequences .... "). If"frame" is given a broad meaning, it even affects
the notion of "rationality." which "gathers not only its force but also its very meaning from the social
context in which it is embedded." Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic
System, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST, sitpra note 26, at 201, 201.
31. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Improving Inductive Inference, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY. supra note 28, at 445.447.
32. See. e.g., JON ELSTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY I -1 5 (1993) (examining "mechanisms that
distort desires and beliefs"); NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 28, at 42, 114-15, 165-66. 192 (stating at
page 192: "People tend to persevere in their beliefs well beyond the point at which logical and
evidential considerations can sustain them."); Richard E. Nisbett et al., PopuliarInduction: Information
Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. supra note 28, at 101, 111-14
(discussing "[albstract versus concrete intbrmation"); Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings
in the Attribution Process: Ot the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social .4ssessments, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 129, 135-36, 144-47 (discussing the "fundamental
attribution error" and "[blelief perseverance in the face of empirical challengcs")l Amos rversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Aivilabilit)': A Heuristic for Judging Irequtec, and Probabiliti, it) J t: DG MENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 163, 164 (noting "the judged frequency of classes is biased bythe
availability of their instances for construction, and retrieval"); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman.
Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. mpra, at 84, 97-98
(noting "people evaluate the probability of events by the degree to which these events are
representative of a relevant model or process"). In sum. it is the conllicting images of a human as a
rational creature capable of reflective choice and ot'a human as "the passive plaything of causal forces




To overcome the distortions that arise when making choices under risk
and uncertainty, experience also helps." By having made similar choices
in the past, having learned of additional sources of information, and having
had the opportunity to see whether one's original estimations of
consequences proved reliable, a person is likely to learn from her
experience and improve her ability to make dependable appraisals. In this
sense, then, one "should have known better" because one has had
substantial experience with the type of decision in question 3 especially if
it is complex,' 5 and therefore has less reason to misestimate eventualities
because of the normal human shortcomings when making choices under
risk and uncertainty. The clearer picture of the contingencies further
excavates a channel that guides the decision.
While one must first have adequate knowledge of the relevant facts,
because a significant decision may have adverse consequences to others,
one must secondly appreciate its normativity. Adverse consequences may
be bad, in a teleological sense, or entail a wrong, in a deontological one.36
The guiding principles and policies of the law include a mixture of consid-
erations aimed at promoting both justice and social welfare. Citizens are
33. See. e.g.. GOODIN, supra note 2 1. at 140 ("For the most part. people tend to act as intuitive
probability assessors, relying upon experience to guide them."); see also FISCHHOFF ET AL.. supra note
30, at 23 ("Competent technical analyses may tell us what primary. secondary, and tertiary
consequences to expect, but not what these consequences really entail. To some extent we are all
prisoners of our own experience, unable to imagine drastic changes in our world or health or relation-
ships."); HOLMES, supra note 3, at 129 ("The tendency of a given act to cause harm under given
circumstances must be determined by experience."); Paul Slovick et al., Facts Versits Fears:
Lnderstanding Perceivied Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, sutpa note 28, at 463, 464
("When laypeople are asked to evaluate risks, they seldom have statistical evidence on hand. In most
cases. they must make infierences based on what they remember hearing or observing about the risk
in question."). For the cconomic conceptualization of experience and training. see JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 147-48 (rev. ed. 1984).
34. For rare eventualities, the person may not even know better with substantial experience. See
GOODIN, supra note 21, at 140 ("Where low-probability events are concerned, experience is a
particularly unreliable teacher.").
35. Studies reveal that people are particularly weak at evaluating alternatives with dissimilar at-
tributes. For example, consumers sometimes find that their complex choices do not satisfy their own
subjective standards. "One source of'the subjective nonoptimality ofsuch decisions seems to be man's
demonstrable inability to take proper account. simultaneously, of the various component attributes of
the alternatives .... " Roger N. Shepard, On Subjectively Optitnum Selection 4nioag Multiattribute
Alternatives, in HUMAN JUDGMENTS AND OPTIMALITY 257.257 (Maynard W. Shelley. II & Glenn L.
Bryan eds., 1964), quoted in RICHARD B. BRANDT. A THEORY OF THE GOOD ANDTH E RIGHT 76 (1979).
36. Teleology emphasizes consequential states of' being, such as good or bad conditions. An
often-espoused goal is the maximization of social welfare. Deontology deemphasizes consequences
and focuses on the acts themselves, considering whether they are just or unjust. A typical maxim of
deontology is Spike Lee's principle, "do the right thing." While, tinder Kantian deontological
reasoning, a wrong occurs irrespective ofwhether there are adverse consequences, a lawsuit, especially
a civil one, almost always involves a complainant who was injured. lir otherwise she does not have
standing to sue.
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expected to conform their behavior to such polycentric canons. 7 This
requires, first of all, knowledge of the operative norms. But again, suitable
conformance is not enabled simply by a basic knowledge of the norms.
This is especially the case in a normative system as complex and dynamic
as a modem one, where the pulls of teleology often encounter the pushes
of deontology, where there may be tensions within each ethical orientation,
and where emerging norms or weights to norms may escape the ken of
those without special needs or occasions to be attentive."8 Relevant
experience helps to clarify the normative picture. Prior deliberation, active
choice, and subsequent reflection on similar decisions 'hone one's
sensitivities to the manifold nuances of the moral realm.
It must be emphasized that engaging in risky activities typically has
normative as well as factual overtones. In discussing the difficulties in
correctly evaluating facts, especially loaded ones, I mentioned the risk and
uncertainty confronting a decisionmaker. But there is another, everyday
sense of "risk," which encompasses both the risk and the uncertainty
considered thus far, that will help to sharpen our focus on the knowledge
proposition. This everyday sense of "risk" refers to an exposure to a
hazard, as when risky conduct exposes a person to a potential harm or loss.
Here we speak of the gravity of a risk, not simply its likelihood. In this
context, both the likelihood and the nature and extent of the potential harm
are part of the calculus of the riskiness of the conduct.39 Knowingly-or
negligently exposing another person to a potential harm or loss, once past
a certain threshold, may be normatively unacceptable behavior.40 The more
one is in a position to appreciate the gravity of the risk, the more one
should know better than to impose the risk on another.
In making proper individual, normative decisions, socialization aug-
ments, and even substitutes for, the lessons of experience. For instance, the
37. To loosely borrow Dworkin's distinction, legal principles are basically means-regarding
(deontological) and policies are ends-regarding (teleological). See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of
Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 22-23 (1977).
38. For approaches to synthesizing deontological and teleological models ofethics, see ROBERT
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 494-98 (1981). On the distinction between the weight of a
moral principle and weighing it, see id. at 474-94.
39. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 191 (1984) ("The important concept for the legis-
lator, then, is neither magnitude of harm nor probability of harm alone, but rather the compound of the
two, which is called risk.").
40. Fletcher identifies the role of the concept ofrisk in our legal system as facilitating an ab-
stract analysis of the likelihood of harm: "We can grasp the effect of conduct -- the creation of the risk
- apart from the conduct itself. And once the risk is separated from conduct, we can evaluate the lisk
and decide whether it is socially beneficial or harmful." FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 6.6.b, at 484.
"This process of reification leads us to think of risks as a type of harm. We can firmulate imperatives
in which the concept of risk fills the place typically reserved for specified harms. 'Don't risk injury
to your neighbor."' Id.
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trucker who considers overloading her truck may not bother with
estimations of the factual risks and uncertainties if she has embraced the
lesson from her caregivers, teachers, and others to "do the right thing" by
obeying the rules, no matter what, or at least short of extraordinary
circumstances. Or, perhaps her estimates of the perils are cautious because
she was taught to be considerate of others and wary of personal dangers.
If so, even if at this subconscious level, her decision is channeled.4' In
sum, the experience and socialization of our trucker lead informed
observers to note that, if she overloads the truck, "she should have known
better."
Gross generality or even stereotyping based on socioeconomic and
other classifications may lead to similar judgments by observers less
informed of the particular circumstances. For instance, while a person
from a privileged background "should have known better" than to make a
particular immoral choice, the street urchin should not have, though
perhaps the urchin still should have known well enough to pass the
threshold for sanctions.4 2 Various other categories of personal charac-
teristics may also lead to similar gross generalities, but these usually
remain in the shadows of private, politically incorrect conversation rather
than the spotlight of legal and political discourse. 3
To conclude, under the channel postulate, the more one's conduct is
guided against an antisocial or illegal act, the more one "knows better" than
to perform it. But we must dig deeper. What are the forces that tend. to
keep people within the channel, making contrary behavior more difficult'?
This leads to another precept, the incentive postulate.
B. The Incentive Postulate
The incentive postulate is that personal choice is channeled by conflict
with, and inducement from, one's preferences and values, and society's
sanctions. The stimuli to avoid conflict or yield to inducement are aroused
41. Bagehot puts it in terms of habit: "The active voluntary part ofa man is very small, and if
it were not econonised by a sleepy kind of habit, its results would be null.... We should accomplish
nothing, for all our energies would be frittered away in minor attempts at petty improvements."
WAL.TER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 9 (Garland Publ'g. Co. 1978) (2d ed. 1872), quoted
in SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 102 (7th ed. 1964).
42. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 6.8.2. at 514 ("The law functions by setting a mininum
threshold of accountability as a condition for attributing wrongdoing.).
43. Support for this proposition is found in the firestorm of controversy surrounding the
publication of the book RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY. THE B[:I.L URVE (1994).
(Vol. 48
YOU SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER
by the perceived payoff matrix for contemplated actions.4 In other words,
when the agent undertakes an analysis of the potential consequences, she
discerns certain costs and benefits, both factually and normatively based.
The perceived costs of an.action, such as possible punishment and shame,
kindle conflict. The perceived benefits, such as possible honor and self-
satisfaction, offer inducement.
Conflict and inducement have origins that may be roughly categorized
as internal and external. Internal conflict and inducement are grounded in
impulses that are largely products of nature and nurture.4" Because the
impulses are inherent (nature),or instilled (nurture) in the fabric of the
agent's persona, they are backward-looking. They stem from existing
psychological dispositions antecedent to the choice in question. 7 Even if
the agent alone knows of her act and its consequences, the internal payoff
is felt to some extent. Self-satisfaction and guilt, for example, need no
observers, though the presence of observers may increase them. External
conflict and inducement, on the other hand, are products of social
sanctions. They are forward-looking in the sense that they result from the
44. Plamenatz comes at this fiom a different angle. Ii addressing what we signify by ascribing
responsibility to a person, he states that we mean that the person could have acted diflerently and "was
not beyond the reach of ecertain kinds of intluencC.'" John Plamenatz. Responsihiliv. Hlame and
Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 173. I 7) (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds..
3d series 1967). We mean that he was persuadable, "that, when he acted, he was amenable to inlluence
by considerations of the kinds that men ordinarily put to themselves or othersi when they contemplate
action." Id. Still, though "the pressure of public opinion no doubt is effective in shaping men's
behaviour.., it is a pressure very different from that of a dagger in the small of the back." J.R.
LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 56 (1966). Nevertheless, through its various sanctions. the state
is coercive. See id. at 56-62. State coercion is seen by some as qualifying, or even negating, the
indepen-dence of moral agents. See. e.g.. NEIL MACCORMICK, Against Moral Disestablishnent. in
LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 18, 23 (1982).
45. A generous view of costs and benefits is called for. "[T]he considerations ot"loss' and 'gain'
are general with respect to the varying criteria of different agents, they are by no means confined to
balance-sheet egoists." GEWIRTH, sispra note 23, at 57. For example, they apply to altruists, ascetics,
voluptuaries and, generally, masochists. See 0. Social norms are partly "sustained by the emotions
that are triggered when they are violated: embarrassment, guilt and shame in the violator; anger and
indignation in the observers." JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAl. SCIENCES 113 (1989).
40. For a general discussion o' the interrelationship of nature, nurture, and the law, see LAW,
BIOLOGY AND CULTURE (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds.. 1983), and for a general discussion
of the interrelationship Or nature, nurture, and the sense ol'justice, see THE SENSE OF JUSTICE. supro
note 28.
47. For some of the conundrums regarding responsibility that spring from the recognition oflthe
unconscious, see MOORE. supra note 13. at 140-42. For a discussion of the relationship of the
unconscious mind to responsibility, see MOORE, siupra note 13. pts. III (Practical Reason and the
Unconscious) & IV (Legal Persons and Psychiatric Subagents): and MOORE, Responsibility and Mie
Uncoiscioius, supra note 19. Moore concludes that Freud's "insight[] about the unconscious dolesi
not ... generally require one to alter radically the view orpersons as free and rational beings who may
be justly held responsible for their consciously intentional actions." . at 1675.
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public response to the choice in question. Honor and shame," for example,
are not private occurrences that ensue without the mediation of society, that
is, outside observers.
The distinction between internal and external conflict and inducement
can be easily overdrawn. They may substantially interrelate,4" or overlap."
To see such overlap or interrelation, let us look back at our trucker's
decision whether to overload her truck. Assume the affirmative choice
risks a criminal fine up to $ 10,000. The possible loss of$10,000 creates an
external conflict concerning the decision to overload.5' But a payout of this
amount of money does not have the same weight for everyone. For the
parsimonious, $10,000 may be nearly as dear as life itself. For the cavalier,
it is "easy come, easy go."5'2 Along with personality differences, there are
48. The terms "shame culture" and "guilt culture" "have been used by anthropologists and
classicists to distinguish between cultures in which self-esteem is based solely on conformity to
external standards of conduct and those in which it is also (or instead) based on having a clear
conscience." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 277 (1981 ). The suggestions that guilt
relates to "internal" concerns with "sin." "inner worth." etc.. while shame relates to "external" concerns
with "honor.""reputation," etc.. and that there are "guilt cultures" and "shame cultures," may be
challenged on the grounds that the terms are not so disconnected. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Person.
Time, tnd Conduct in Bali, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 360. 401 (1973). Nevertheless,
"js]hame is the Ieeling of'disgrace and humiliation which follows upon a transgression found out; guilt
is the feeling of secret badness attendant upon one not. or not yet. Ibund out." /d 0r. breach of moral
norms gives rise to guilt while breach of social norms gives rise to shame, See .Ion lster. Weakness
of Will and the Free-Rider Problem, I ECoN,. & PHIL. 231.240 (1985). For further challenges to the
idea that guilt, unlike shame, is internalized, see ALLAN GIBBARD. WISE CHOICES, Ar FEELINGS 136-
40 (1990) (stating at page 137: "Guilt. we might say, normally involves a consciousness of having
done wrong, and shame a consciousness ot'some personal inadequacy."); AGNES HELLER.THE POWER
OF SHAME 2-9 (1985); RICHARDS. supra note II. at 252-67; and RICHARD WOLLHEIM. THE THREAD
OF LIFE 220 (1984) ("[Ilf we are to think of shame as the prime moral sentiment of'evolved morality,
of morality beyond the superego, it must be conceived to be just as much an interiorized sentiment as
guilt is."). See also ARISTOTLE. ETHICA NICOMACHEA I 128b (W.D. Ross ed.. Oxford Univ. Press
1942) (asserting that shame is "more like a feeling than a state ofcharacter. It is defined, at any rate,
as a kind of tfear ofdishonour."); HERBERT MORRIS, Guilt and Shane, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE
59. 60-63 (1976) (discussing differences between shame and guilt and their roles in the law); John
Deigh. Shaine and Self-Esteen,: A Critique. 93 ETHICS 225 (1983) (discussing guilt and shame,
especially the Rawlsian notion of shame).
49. For example, van den Haag expresses the connection this way: "Whether or not a crime is
committed depends on external stimuli, pressures, opportunities, and threats; and. on the other hand.
on internal dispositions to respond to these or to restrain oneself." ERNEST VAN DEN IIAAG. PUNISHING
CRIMINALS 66 (1975).
50. See id. at 68-69 (discussing how internal and external conflic aiid inducement overlap).
51. The potential fine creates a conflict regarding the choice to commit the illegal act and an
inducement to choose not to commit it. In this sense, then. each conllict and inducement enters the
yes-or-no decision payoff' matrix on both sides. To trincate this accounting complication, I refer to
conllict and inducement with respect to affirmative decisions only, not negative decisions, as when
someone decides not to do a particular act.
52. See VAN DEN HAAG. supra note 49, at 66 ("Di fferent personalities respond difterently to the
same external situation-that is what marks personalities as different.").
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wealth effects.53 The rich trucker is generally less concerned about the fine
than the poor one.
Yet the origin of personality traits, such as parsimony and cavalierness,
seems to have various sources, both internal and external. Perhaps nature
leaves its mark with its skewing, genetic biochemistry. For example, genes
might naturally dispose some to risk aversion and others to risk
preference.54 Nurture must certainly play a role in molding these
personality traits by means of prior reinforcements from caregivers and
others." Since the reinforcements that mold traits originally come from
sources external to the chooser, the distinction between internal and
external conflict and inducement becomes ambiguous.5"
The backward-looking aspect of the internal motivation and the
forward-looking aspect of the external help clarify the difference between
them. The potential reach of internal conflict and inducement, whatever
their origins, is in place and fairly fixed at the time of the decision.
Conflict and inducement have helped form the chooser's existing
personality, which, except in novelistic circumstances, is not about to
change significantly because of the impending choice alone. In this regard,
we say that a chosen act reflects the actor's character. External incentives,
on the other hand, are more contingent. If the fine for overloading a truck
decreases to $100, or a person offers the trucker $25,000 for performing the
53. The wealth effect, based on the supposition of the declining marginal utility of wealth, im-
plies that the affluence of the evaluator atfiets the weight she gives to a particular dollar amount. See,
e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 119-27 (3d rev. ed. 1966).
54. See JEROME KAGAN, GALEN'S PROPHECY: TEMPERAMENT IN HUMAN NATURE (1994) (dis-
cussing the genetic dispositions for, among other qualitites, inhibited or uninhibited temperaments).
55. Even among those who ascribe personality traits largely to nurture, there may be a place for
individual will. George Mead, for example, argued:
[T]he self can only exist by virtue of a linguistic competence which internalizes the values
and attitudes of others.... [But], [a]t any given moment individuals have the'capacity to
distance themselves from who they are, or who they have been made, and to reflect on
these facts and perhaps even to change them.
Robert Post, Tradition. the Self and Substantive Due Process: A Coimenton Michael Sandel, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 553,558 (1989). Tribe insists that "personal and social choices serve not merely to implement
'given' systems of values, but also to define, and sometimes to reshape, the values- indeed the very
identit)-of the choosing individual or community." Laurence H. Tribe, TechnologyAssessment and
the Fowrth Discontinui,.: The Limtits of Instrumental Rationaliy, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617,634 (1973)
(citing Laurence H. Tribe, Poli) Science: Analsis or Ideolog?. 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 99 (1972)).
"The decision-maker chooses not merely how to achieve his ends but what thO " ale to be and who he
is to become." Id. at 634-35. Is the capacity of individuals to distance themselves from who they are
and choose who they are to become a product of nature or nurture?
56. Arrow asks: "[Hlow logically do we distinguish between the capacities which somehow
define the person, and those which are the result of external actions of a society'?" Kenneth J. Arrow.
Values and Collective Decision-Making, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 44, at
215.220. Since vision may be equally good from either excellent eyes or glasses, "[ iIs the vision more
peculiarly mine in one case than in the other'?" Id. at 220.
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illegal act, the choice confronting the trucker takes on a different color,
though her character is essentially unchanged.
But a potential fine creates conflicts and inducements beyond merely
the dollars at stake. As a criminal sanction it triggers a host of reactions.
First, the agent confronts internally the prospect of thinking of herself as
an outlaw of sorts. Though truck overloading hardly gives rise to a tell-tale
heart, for the first-timer or the reflective, many sentiments must accompany
the anticipation of "crossing the line." Second, the agent confronts
externally the prospect of being considered an outlaw by others. 7 This
may also be daunting in various Ways," though, again, truck overloaders
are rarely taunted for this by the neighborhood brats. Still, one's self- and
public esteem, among other things, are affected by whether one's conduct
is proper,59 though perhaps not often enough. But obviously all the
incentives are not against the choice to commit the particular criminal act,
or the decision would not even be on the table. Some benefits, perhaps
both internal and external, are in the offing. Ask Leopold and Loeb. For
a gang member, eager for acceptance by the others, the dollars at stake
from the possible fine may be the only significant disincentive."' In a well-
considered decision, then, of even minimal complexity, there is an array of
conflicts and inducements, internal and external, that must be thrown onto
the scales. The more the scales tilt to one side, the more the agent "should
have known better" than to opt for the higher pan."1
Some of the sources of the internal incentives, a few of which have
already been mentioned, may be identified. Nurture (or socialization)
certainly creates strong incentives. 2 The social learning theorists, for
57. Van den Haag refers to the effects ofstigma as internal: "This symbolic effect of punishment
helps form the all important internal barriers which restrain most of us from law violations without
conscious thought, let alone calculation." VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 49, at 63-64.
58. For an argument that societal reactions may give a person more reason to avoid illegal
conduct than do official sanctions, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE
174, 190-94 (1973).
59. See Mary 0. Cameron, Self-Perception and the Shoplifter, in PERCEPTION IN CRIMINOLOGY
416, 420 (Richard L. Henshel & Robert A. Silverman eds., 1975) ("[Nlether the fear of punishment
nor the objective severity of the punishment in itself is the crucial point in relation to the change from
criminal to law abiding behavior. Rather the threat to the person's system of values and prestige
relationships is involved."); Frank Tannenbaum, The Dramatization of Evil, ill PERCEPTION IN
CRIMINOLOGY, supra, at 351,351-52 (arguing that continued delinquent acts cause the public- and
self-perception to shift from the delinquent's act being evil to the individual being evil).
60. See Cameron, supra note 59, at 419-20 (discussing "in-group" support).
61. This suggests one might "know better" than to fail to perform an improper act. Imagine a
gang member being confronted by the other members for her refusal to go along with an illegal act:
"You should know better than to cross your sisters!"
62. See. e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 58, at 119-21. Forexample, '[o]ne of the better
validated theories of crime and delinquency is Hirschi's ... social bonding theory. HItrschi claims that
those individuals with strong social ties (bonds) are less free to break rules than those whose ties are
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example, instruct that moral upbringing is key to a person's moral
practices. One's entire value system is largely formed by environmental
influences.63 In addition to environmental influences, education and
weak or become attenuated." Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do
Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 457,461 (1983) (citing TRAVIS HIRSCHI. ('AUSES OF
DELINQUENCY (1969)). "That environment plays a significant role in shaping an individual's values
and behavior is beyond dispute." Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background ": Shouldthe Criniinal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?. 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 9, 9 (1985).
rrespecitve, "[n]o jurisdiction in the United States orelsewhere recognizes a criminal defense based
on socioeconomic deprivation simpliciter." Id. Most scholars reject the rotten social background
["RSB"] defense, mainly for practical reasons. Id. at 18. One scholar rejects it because the child of
the ghetto "'allowed himself to be shaped by his environment.' Id. (citing Nathaniel Branden, Free
Will, Moral Responsibilitt and the Law, 42 S.CAL. L. REV. 264,278 (1974)). Delgado finds that there
are many available defenses for the RSB defendant, though some cases fall between the cracks. See
Delgado, supra, at 37-54. He proposes and justifies comprehensive defenses. See id. at 54-79. Away
from this end of the socio-economic spectrum, Rawls argues that "[tihe assertion thit a man deserves
the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is ... problematic;
for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can
claim no credit." RAWLS, supra note 14, at 104. For a discussion of the moral arbitrariness of the
molding influences ofboth nature and nurture, see Wojciech Sadurski, Natural and Social Lottery, and
Concepts ofthe Self, 9 LAW & PHIL. 157 (1990), and for its threat to the idea of personal responsibility,
see Michele M. Moody-Adams, Culture, Responsibiliy, and Affected Ignorance, 104 ETHICS 291
(1994) (opposing the attack on responsibility because ofcultural influences); Arthur Ripstein, Equalio.
Luck. and Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994); and Samuel Scheffler, Responsibiliy.
Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992).
63. See, e.g., Thomas E. Wren, Social Learning Theotr. Self-Regulation. (and Morality, 92
ETHiCS 409, 409-12 (1982). The social learning theorists may cite Aristotle's discussion of the two
kinds of virtue: "[l]ntellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching...
while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit .... [Therefore,] none of the moral virtues arises
in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature." ARISTOTLE,
supra note 48, at I 103a; see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The hnpnct of the Concept of Cilture on the
Concept of Man, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CLLTURES, supra note 48, at 33, 35, 49, 50 (stating at
page 50: "Our ideas, our values, our acts, even our emotions, arc, like our nervous system itself,
cultural products-products manufactured, indeed, out of the tendencies, capacities. and dispositions
with which we were born, but manufactured nonetheless."); CI.IFFORD GEERTZ. Coninion Sense as a
Cultural System, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 73,76 (1983) (asserting that even common sense is culturally
situated); CLIFFORDGEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Cotparative Perspective, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 163, 173 ("[L]egal facts are made not born, are socially constructed ....");
RoM HARRI, PERSONAL BEING 20, 22 (1983) (discussing person as "cultural artefact," not "natural
object," and perception, rationality and emotions as "cultural endowments not native achievements");
JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 126-27 (1985) ("We are ourselves to some degree formed by the
languages that we use, for they imply criteria of selection, grounds of motivation, dispositions of mind
and feeling, ways of telling the stories of our individual and collective lives, and so on, all of which
become part of ourselves."); Richard E. Flathman, Convention. Contractorianist. and Freedom, 98
ETHICS 91, 95 (1987) (discussing the Rousseau-Wittgenstein understanding that "[t]he desires and
preferences that I can form are limited by the concepts 'desire' and 'preference,' and these limits are
given by beliefs and understandings that are socially established, that are iniie only insolar as they are
also out's"); James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161,
166 (1987) ("[T]he languages we speak, and the cultural practices they at once reflect and make
possible, form our minds by habituating them to certain modes of attention, certain ways of seeing and
conceiving of oneself and of the world."). Hence, fora person raised in a society steeped in beliefs
of witches and witchcraft, who upon displacement to a Europeanized community perceives someone
to be casting a mortal spell, "even the voluntary, knowing, intentional, and even premeditated killing
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experience are critical in developing the abilities to evaluate risks,M weigh
possible consequences, and learn from one's failures and successes.
("After the discomfort from that ticket, next time I'll remember to stop at
a yellow light."'65) Finally, refined judgment, whereby one is able to
discern whether a contemplated act falls within a particular rule, is honed
by practice and training." ("On further reflection upon unpleasureable
incidents of gratuitously hurting others, I have decided that white lies do
not fall within the proscriptions of the truthtelling maxim, and falsely
telling a person at a social event that she looks well is a white lie."67)
of the 'witch' simply does not have the significance it otherwise would." FINGARI iIE& HASSE, suprt
note 13, at 23 1.
64. Apparently, even the notion of risk is socially constructed and learned by experience. See
Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity. Confidence. Trust: Pioblenis and Ahernatives, in TRUST 94, 98 (Diego
Gambetta ed., 1988) ("Since 'risk' is a relatively new word, spreading from whatever sources into
European languages via Italy and Spain only after the invention of the printing press, we may suppose
that the possibility of making this distinction [between dangers and risks) is likewise a result of social
and cultural development.").
65. This driver is obviously not from New York, nor, for that matter, from just about anywhere
else I have been, except Japan.
66. According to Kant,judgment "is the ability to determine 'whether something ... stand[s]
under a given rule.' While theory can be taught,judgment is a 'natural gift,' a peculiar talent which
can be practiced only." George Miller, Introduction to IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT
MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON'T WORK IN PRACTICE 17 (E.B. Ashton trans., Univ. of Penn.
Press 1974) (1923) (footnotes to Kant omitted); see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQU E OF PURE REASON
98-100 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., rev. ed., Willey Book Co. 1900) (1781); Lawrence Blum, Moral
Perception and Particularity, 101 ETHICS 701 (1991 ) (discussing, among other related topics, the
general notion of moral judgment); Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note II, at 3, 14 (stating that under a natural law viewpoint, "a person's
capacity to make sound moral judgements over the whole set of choices which arise in life will not be
satisfactorily developed unless the person has acquired practical wisdom and the moral virtues."): Jon
Elster, 7/ie Market and the Foriiui: Three Va'ieties of Political Thcoi, in FOUNIDATIONS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY 103, 109 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) ("The notion ofjudgment is
... difficult to define formally, but at least we know that there are persons who have this quality to a
higher degree than others: people who are able to take account of vast and diffuse evidence that more
or less clearly bears on the problem at hand, in such a way that no element is given undue
importance."); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 332-33 (1989) ("The exercise
of judgment, as Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein clearly saw, cannot be fully characterized in an
explicit metatheory .... At some point, the ability to apply rules must rest on some capacity other
than mastering rules."); Gregory Leyh, Legal Education and the Public Life, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS
269, 289 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) ("[T]he making of sound judgments-in law as in life-is... a
matter of 'weighing up the whole' and of testing one's judgments against those of other judging
persons. Sound human judgment moves back and forth between universals and particulars in a flexible
and mutually informing way."); N.E. Simmonds, Judgment and Mercy, 13 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 52,
56-58 (1993) (explicating Kant's theory of judgment). For a general exposition of the notion of
judgment, see HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 219-22 (1961 ); for the need forjudges,
see LUCAS, supra note 44, at 25-26; and for a definition of competent moral judges, see Rawls, supra
note 3, at 178-8 1.
67. Arendt may agree: "[Jludgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is never
univer-sally valid. Its claims to validity can never extend further than the others in whose place the
judging person has put himself for his considerations." ARENDT, supra note 66, at 22 1.
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Nature (or genetic endowment) also creates strong internal incentives.
To partially track the sources in nurture given above, the cognitive
development theorists, rejecting the views of the social learning theorists,
point to nature as the primary source of a person's moral values."5
Kohlberg, for example, has found that, as one grows and matures, one's
moral views evolve through a series of genetically programmed stages.
Beginning with egoistic responses to rewards and punishments, and passing
through perceptions of social values as based on convention, those reaching
the highest stages come to realize that proper morality is based on Kantian
principles of equality and reciprocity. " Also, it was posited above that risk
disposition may be partly biochemical.7" A person's given intelligence
potential certainly must also be a critical component in her abilities to
weigh consequences and learn from experience. ("Now if I must go 120
miles in the next three hours, traveling through various speed zones, can I
get there without speeding?") Even refined judgment may be somewhat
innate. As law students discover after their first round of final examin-
ations, "some people just have the knack!"
68. Most reject the strong dichotomy. "As for the relationship between nature and nurture, or
heredity and environment ... the older dichotomy between mutually incompatible explanations of
behavior has been superseded by a more sophisticated 'interactional' model .... Even learned
behaviors depend upon evolved biological capacities, including the capacities for being 'rewarded' and
'punished' in learning situations." Peter A. Coming, Himan Nature Rediivus. in HUMAN NATURE
IN POLITICS 19, 27 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977). For examples of the
"interactional" model, see JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE
(1985); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 2 (1993) ("The argument of this book is that people
have a natural moral sense, a sense that is formed out of'the interaction of their innate dispositions with
their earliest familial experiences."); and Alexander Rosenberg, The Political PhilosoplhyofBiological
Endowments: Some Considerations, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y I, 4 (1987) ("Thus, some biological
endowments will not be under any agent's control [hereditary traits], others will be the responsibility
of those who nurture the agent [domestic traits], and still others will he the responsibility ofthe agent
himself [acquired traits]."). Nussbaum surveys the "common ground among the major cognitive
theories of emotion ... [including] today's philosophy of psychology and cognitive psychology, the
more cognitive parts of psychoanalytic thought, and the various forms of 'social construction' theory
about emotion that prevail in social anthropology and also in radical social history," and finds "that
emotions are taught to us by ourculture from early infancy, in patterns of interaction between the child
and others, prominently including parents, and later including the wider community." Martha
Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy ofLove, 98 ETHICS 225,234 (1988). "But," she
adds parenthetically, "parents, as psychoanalytic thought too frequently forgets, already embody and
teach the social conception of which they are a part." Id. at 234-35. See generally Symposium, Moral
Development, 92 ETHICS 407 (1982) (discussing social learning and cognitive development theories).
69. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984). For brief
summaries of Kohlberg's stages of moral development, see Susan Moller Okin, Thinking Like a
Woman, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 145,148-50 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
1990); and Bill Puka, An Interdisciplinaro Treatment of Kohlberg, 92 ETHICS 468,469-71 (1982). See
generally JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE C1ILD (1948).
70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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External incentives are multitudinous. Among them are compensation,
rewards, prizes, honors, respect, reverence, criminal and civil sanctions,
shame, banishment, ostracism, and a host of other carrots and sticks.
The effects of conflict and inducement can now be summarized. The
more a particular choice involves an overall conflict with, or inducement
by, natural propensities and nurtured inculcations, the more one's choice
is channeled. But if this is the case, when, if ever, might one choose to act
contrary to one's channeling?
C. The Disposition Postulate
The disposition postulate is that the more one's choice is channeled
against an antisocial or illegal act, the more one must deliberately and
willfully resist the guidance (or the greater the character flaw must be) to
choose it. Conversely, though not reflected in the standard use of the
knowledge proposition, "you should have known better," there is a
symmetry to the disposition postulate with respect to socially desirable
acts: the more one's choice is channeled toward an exemplary act, the less
willpower one must exert to perform it. On the contrary, the more one
must deliberately and willfully resist one's channeling, the greater the
character flaw must be to choose not to perform the exemplary act.
Since acts are presumptively rational," one expects there to be reasons
for the agent to resist her channeling. The perceived benefits of the choice
contrary to the channeling must overcome the disposition to conform to it.
72
71. Under the principle of charity, economists assume, "as a working hypothesis, the rationality
ol' any given action, however strange and unadapted it might appear to be at first glance." ELSTER,
supra note 33, at 154. Social scientists should too. See id. at 154-55. Elsewhere. Elster advances this
hypothesis on the grounds of parsimony. See ELSTER, supra note I1, at 29 ("On grounds of
parsirnony, ... we should begin by assuming nothing but rationality."). Yet this presumption may be
too strong: "But why must it be assumed that rational people never do irrational things? Is it not one
of the commonest things in the world for perfectly rational normal people to behave in ways which are
manifestly contrary to their own interest?" P.S. Atiyah, Executory Contiacts. Expectation Damages.
and the Economic Analysis of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 150, 156 (1986). Promising is one
of the ill-considered acts commonly done: "It is misleading to start with the assumption that promises
are typically the actions of careful, rational, calculating individuals who pause and deliberate before
deciding to say anything as to their intentions, and make up their minds whether they wish to announce
these intentions in promissory form or not." P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAw 172 (1981).
72. This conclusion smacks of tautology. The economic analysis of observed failures to exploit
profitable opportunities, rather than assuming irrationality, ad hoc shifts in preferences, etc.,
"postulates the existence of costs, monetary or psychic, of taking advantage of these opportunities that
eliminate their profitability-costs that may not be easily 'seen' by outside observers." Gary Becker,
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 11, at 108, 112.
Though this may appear tautological, Becker believes this economic approach, "applicable to all
human behavior," yields useful results because it "provides a toundation for predicting the responses
to various changes." id.
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The benefits could relate to both the factual and the normative aspects of
the choice.
The knowledgeable person making the contrary choice may neglect
aspects of her choice that are largely factual. Through laziness, indif-
ference, carelessness, and so forth, she fails to attend to the available facts
and her special knowledge, or declines to bother with an appropriate
evaluation of the possible consequences that follow from the known facts. 73
Perhaps her attention is drawn toward other demands, which she considers
more immediate or important, such as when our trucker, eager to meet a
promised delivery deadline, fails to appreciate that her truck may be
overloaded. To maintain that this choice is still rational, we must conclude,
though the notion seems strained in places, that the agent prefers or values
her laziness, indifference, or the other demands, highly enough to outweigh
the conflict with her channeled tendencies. Regardless, there is still a place
for the knowledge proposition in dealing with the inattentive person. By
increasing the sanction against her, we will goad her in the future, and
others like her, to be more attentive.74 We will make sure that "she should
have known even better."
Similarly, the perceived benefits of the conduct contrary to the
channeling may outweigh the normative force that helped to form the
agent's channeled disposition to do the proper thing. For example, a person
may undertake a task that can be accomplished by conduct either that puts
others at risk, or conduct, which is more personally burdensome, that does
not. Even though the high value of refraining from harming others may
have been implanted in the agent, she may nevertheless opt to engage in the
risky conduct because she values her own convenience even higher than the
risk to others. Perhaps her motivation is not conscious, but rather her self-
73. Anscombe refers to the situation in which "the ignorance is voluntary, e.g., careless; or even
chosen, as when someone has the attitude: '1 don't want to know about that because I might have to
think or act differently if I did."' G.E.M. Anscombe, Comment, in PRACTICAL REASON 17, 20
(Stephan Komer ed., 1974).
74. Hart makes a similar point in questioning whether the threat of punishment could be effective
for those "who committed theircrime through inadvertent unthinking negligence" since, by definition,
they failed to deliberate. H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPON-
SIBILITY. slpra note 14, at 113, 133. He answers in the affirmative: "The threat of punishment is
something which causes him to exert his faculties, rather than something which enters as a reason for
conforming to the law when he is deliberating whether to break it or not. It is perhaps more like a goad
than a guide." Id. at 134; see also H.L.A. HART, Negligence. Mens Rea and Crininal Responsibility,
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 136, 157 ("'P]unishment supplies men with an
additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties, and to draw upon their experience.'
(quoting Professor' Wechsler)).
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control is overcome by a vague impulse."s Possibly, though she was
brought up to the contrary, she opts, despite its risks to herself and others,
for "the life of spontaneity, impulse, excitement, and risk."76 Or, though
she knows better, she may actually prefer to harm others because of
personal, malicious satisfaction." If reasons like these drive the agent to
make the inappropriate choice, she has embraced socially undesirable
normative values despite knowing better.
Very often it appears that an agent makes a choice contrary to her
channeling not because she is driven to it, but because she floats past it.
The following scenario seems common. At some time a person is
confronted with a choice that is close to the line of what she knows better
than to do. Serious reflection in light of her accepted values inclines her
not to perform the particular act, but the mandate is not very insistent and
short-term convenience and personal advantage are inducements to the
contrary. For example, she discovers, several blocks away, that the cashier
at the restaurant gave extra change. For this particular decision (whether
to return the extra change to the restaurant), insignificant as it first appears,
she might not bother with serious reflection. In any event, as a result of
rationalization, carelessness, thoughtlessness, or caprice, the line is
crossed.78 From this point the tale becomes familiar because many such
tales exist in everyday lore to caution the unwary. Eventually, for some
people, choices routinely cross far over the line and invade the realm of
acts known, upon neglected reflection, to be quite improper. Cognitive
dissonance may make the decisions easier, 7 especially when aided by the
75. "The spectrum of culpability teaches us that culpability is not only a matter of cognitive
foresight, but of self-control. The issue of self-control . . . requires subtle judgments of degree."
FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 5.1.3, at 353. At some point, the specter of "irresistible impulse" arises.
But for practical reasons, among others, I shun this specter. "It is by now a commonplace observation
that it is impossible to distinguish between an irresistible impulse and one simply not resisted."
Stephen J. Morse, Psychology. Deteravinisnt. and Legal ResponsibilitY, in THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL
INSTRUMENT 35, 76 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
76. FEINBERG, slpra note 2, at 109. On the other hand, "Islone people quite naturally pref'er
adventure and risk to tranquility and security, spontaneity to dcliberation, turbulent passions to salety."
Id. at I 1. This is not in'ational. See id.
77. The law declares motivations such as this out of bounds. See FINGARETA"E & HASSE, supra
note 13, at 230 ("The law expects us to compensate for such traits as quick temper, weakness of will,
cruelty, greed, ambition, and hatred.").
78. Yet even here, the problem is not that the agent suffers from weakness of'the will. She could
easily act otherwise if she so chose. For the meaning of weakness of the will or akrasia, see, for
example, Donald Davidson, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in MORAL CONCEPTS 93 (Joel
Feinberg ed., 1969).
79. Cognitive dissonance "is motivational rather than cognitive. The organism seems to have
a need for interior tranquillity, which makes it adjust its desires to its beliefs (or vice versa) until they
are relatively consonant with each other." ELSTER, supra note 32, at 12 (fbotnote omitted); see also
WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 82 (K. Codell Carter ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1971) (1798) ("Self-deception is of all things the most easy. Whoever ardently wishes to find
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distortions of choice under risk and uncertainty. From frequent rubbing,
callouses appear on the conscience.
80
Though she once knew better, at some point, when conflict vanishes
from the conscious thought process related to the particular types of
improper choices, it is fair to judge that the agent's character has become
transformed.8 She reveals who she is by what she does. - An action out
of habit, then, may lead to the conclusion that the agent is less blameworthy
because the act was not deliberate." Yet, the knowledge proposition may
cut the other way. Though she no longer does know any better, she still
should have known better. At one point, before she transformed herself,
she did indeed know better. We blame her more for her habitual act than
a proposition true, may be expected insensibly to veer towards the opinion that suits his inclination.");
Daniel T. Gilbert & Joel Cooper, Social Psychological Strategies of Self-Deception. in SELF-
DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING 75,84 (Mike W. Martin ed., 1985) (The "theory of cognitive
dissonance maintains that simultaneously held beliefs that are logically inconsistent will result in a
psychological tension state-a state of cognitive dissonance-that can only be attenuated by rectifying
the inconsistency."). For a brief introduction to the notion ofcognitive dissonance, see ELSTER, supra
note 11, at 20-23. In economic terms, the theory of cognitive dissonance represents thiree propositions:
"First, persons not only have preferences over states of the world, but also over their beliefs about the
state of the world. Second, persons have some control over their beliefs .... Third. .... beliefs once
chosen persist over time." George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences
of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307 (1982).
80. Furthermore, "[mloralistic appeals to change one's conduct ... tend to intensify the very
motives that evoke self-deception." Herbert Fingarette. Alcoholism and Self Deception, in SELF-
DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING, supra note 79. at 52, 64.
81. See. e.g., Patemoster et al., supra note 62, at 467 ("Whatever the reasons for an initial
involvement in criminal activity, it seems likely that such activity can subsequently weaken one's
attachment to conventional others, belief in the legitimacy of social norms, commitment to
conventional goals, and involvement in conventional activities.").
82. Dewey and Arendt subscribe to this assessment. "A voluntary act may ... be defined as one
which manifests character, the test of its presence being the presence of desire and deliberation .
John Dewey, The Moral Situation, in MORALS AND VALUES, supra note 8, at 24, 24 (1908).
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world .... This disclosure of
'who' . . . somebody is-his qualities. gills. talents, and shortcomings, which he may
display or hide-is implicit in everything somebody says and does.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 179 (1958).
83. Kant was led to this conclusion for some situations: "Habit makes an action easy until at last
it becomes a necessity. Such necessity as a result of habit, because it letters our will, diminishes our
responsibility; yet the actus through which the habit was acquired, must be imputed to us." IMMANUEL
KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 64 (Louis Infield trans., Harper Torchbooks 1963) (1924). Kant
elaborates on his caveat with an infelicitous stereotype: "A man, for instance, who is brought up by
gipsies until the habit of evil conduct has become a necessity, is responsible in a lesser degree ....
Accordingly, we should be held less responsible for habits which are innate than for those which we
acquire." Id. at 64-65. Brandt, on the other hand, begins unpacking the meaning of "x is morally
blameworthy on account of z" by placing personality traits at the center: "Some trait (or set of traits)
of x's character was responsible for z in the sense that some trait (set of traits) was below standard
.... " Richard B. Brandt, Blameworthiness and Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 16
(A.. Melden ed., 1958) (emphasis omitted).
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we blame a habitual actor who never knew any better. 4  Behavior
stemming from character defects that accrue in this manner-we might call
them cultivated character traits---do not seem to diminish,- at least not
significantly, ascriptions of responsibility and blameworthiness.8"
In sum, under the disposition postulate, the more one is channeled
against improper conduct, the more one must resist this guidance, actively
or passively, to choose otherwise. A deliberate and willful act is required
to overcome one's formed disposition, at least until one has re-formed the
disposition through persistent actions contrary to the original channeling.86
What does it say of a person to make an illegal or antisocial choice under
this scenario?
D. The Accountability Postulate
The accountability postulate is that the more one deliberately and
willfully chooses an improper act," or the more it is the product of one's
84. Plamenatz, in assessing a person's responsibility for an act, would ask, among other ques-
tions: "If he did not know [what he was doing or that it was wrong], to what extent was his ignorance
an effect of his own past actions, when he did know what he was doing?" Plamenatz, stipra note 44,
at 180 (emphasis omitted).
85. Perhaps no character defects, cultivated or not, diminish responsibility. "Character, how-
ever, is not an accidental property of a person. As Aristotle maintained, it is the product of intentional
choices that have become ingrained habits of acting." PETER A. FRENCH, RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS
I16 (1992) (citing ARISTOTLE, stpro note 48, bk. II). Do the insights of modern psychology challenge
this generalization? Michael Moore wrote a lengthy book to defend the "view that we are responsible
for who we are and what we do because we have the capacities rationally to will our fate in this world."
MOORE, supra note 13, at xi. "Such a view entails ultimate metaphysical faith in our reason and its
power to control our actions." /i. But as the title to his hook intimates, he does not believe that we
are beyond various influences. Yet "[t]he thesis is that if'lawyers and psychiatrists would but look (in
a philosophical way), they would see that nothing in the psychiatric view of persons contradicts the
law's presupposition that a person is an autonomous and a rational agent." l. at 2.
86. For example, persons mentioned above who act pursuant to the chosen "life of spontaneity,
impulse, excitement, and risk," see sutpra note 76, though their actions are not "deliberately chosen."
may "have long since 'deliberately chosen' the way of life in which deliberate choices play' no
important role." FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 109. On the other hand, if"their very lit-plans are
spontaneous and unexamined, their guiding policies do indeed reflect their characters in deep and
important ways without being 'deliberately chosen."' Id. Some commentators assert that, by making
choices, one can reform one's values and attitudes, and even one's own identity. See sttpra note 55
(discussing Mead and quoting Tribe).
87. For a scrutiny of the distinctions among intention, deliberation, and purpose, see J.L. AUS-
TIN, Three Ways of Spilling Ink, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 272 (3d ed. 1979). He concludes: "I act
deliberately when I ... weighed up, in however rudimentary .. , a tashion, the pros and cons .... The
pros and cons are not confined to moral pros and cons, nor need I decide in favour of what I think best
or what has the most reasons in favour of it." Id. at 286; see also Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism,
in PATERNALISM 3, 7 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) ("Chosen actions are those that are decided upon by
deliberation, and that is a process that requires time, information, a clear head, and highly developed
rational fac ulties.").
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cultivated character defect," the more one is blameworthy for so
choosing. 9 Conversely, regarding an exemplary act, which is outside the
reach of the knowledge proposition, the less one must deliberately and
willfully choose it, the less one is praiseworthy for so choosing.9" To
emphasize, in the case of the person who has rechanneled her own
disposition, the accountability postulate would maintain that the more one
deliberately and willfully cultivates harmful character traits, re-forms
dispositions towards illegal or antisocial acts, the more one is blameworthy
for choosing such conduct.
At this point, there are two plausible conclusions to be drawn from the
reasoning behind the accountability postulate. These conclusions emerge
more conspicuously when we examine a person who, under the circum-
88. [o put it in the negative. "[al man may be regarded as morally innocent it his actions do not
result from a mental state (e.g., malice) or-a character defct (e.g., negligence) which we regard as
morally blameworthy." JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, The Killing ofthe Innocent, in RETRIBUi ION,.JuSTICE.
ANDTHERAPY 3, 5 (1979).
89. Hobbes, when discussing guilt and punishment, finds that -[t]he Degrees olf (rine are taken
on divers Scales, and measured, first, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause." THOMAS HOBBES.
LEVIATHAN 233 (Oxford Univ. Press 1909) (1651). A proposition which essentially combines the
accountability and disposition postulates has been advanced by Harold Kelley. Schoeman describes
Kelley's "augmentation principle": "Basically, this principle indicates that the greater the obstacles,
costs, and inhibitions an agent overcomes in performing a given action, the greater the causal role and
the moral attribution assigned to the agent." Ferdinand Schoeman, Statistical Norms and Moral
Attributions, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER. ANDTHE EMOTIONS 287,297 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987) (citing Harold Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution. 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 114 (1973)).
"It is assumed that people are equipped with strong inhibitions against harmful behavior; thus harrful
actions are probably the result of especially powerful and profound inclinations that haunt the agent's
character." Id. at 297-98.
The inverse of'the accountability postulate has also been advanced: "I fsocial conditioning makes
a person lack the courage to choose (perhaps even to 'desire' what is denied but what would be valued
ifehosen), then it would be unfair to undertake the ethical assessment assiuning that she does have that
effective choice." AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 149 (1992). Similarly, Westermarck
observes: "I think most people would admit that ... a pickpocket who was kidnapped as a child by a
band of pickpockets and trained to the profession should be looked upon with sone indulgence."
EDWARD WESTERMARCK, ETHICAL RELATIVITY 178 (1932). For Kant's concurrence, see suipra note
83 and accompanying text. A comparable point has been made regarding channels etched by nature
rather than nurture. See FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 13, at 200 ("fa person's mental powers
are impaired in such a way as to disable him at least to some material extent friom rational control of
his conduct in respect to the requirements of the criminal law, the person in that respect acts with
materially lessened criminal responsibility."); FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 4.2.2.
90. For an interesting case study of the rescuers of Jews from Nazi threats, see Kristen R.
Monroe et al., Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Na:i Enrope. 101
ETHICS 103 (1990). As to the rescuers' motivations, the interviewers found "no evidence of a need
to atone for past wrongs, no evidence of'either goods or participation altruism, no clusters of altruists,
no expectation of reward, and no cost/benefit calculus." Id. at 115. "Rescuers apparently made little
or no conscious decision when they rescued Jews." Id. at 121. But the behavior triggering rewards
is not symmetrical to the behavior triggering liability. As Fletcher suggests, rewards are granted for
supererogatory acts, which must be chosen by the actor. Liability, on the other hand. may be imposed
for inadvertence. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 9.2.3, at 710 (considering liability for criminal
punishment).
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stances, falls outside the core of the knowledge proposition, the person who
we must strain to declare "she should have known better." When grossly
ignorant, we may judge that she did not have sufficient reason to know
better to be considered blameworthy at all. Or, when she is somewhat
more knowledgeable, we may judge that she did have sufficient reason to
know better and is therefore culpable, but she does not have sufficient
reason to deserve the maximum sanction. In light of these two judgments,
the accountability postulate leads to two theses applicable to the person
who does have substantial knowledge. Along one path is the following
assertion, which will be called the threshold thesis: "Because you should
have known better, you acted reprehensibly (that is, in a blameworthy
manner) in circumstances in which we would not blame the less
knowledgeable." Along the other path is the assertion, which will be called
the magnitude thesis: "Because you should have known better, you acted
more reprehensibly than would be our judgment of the less
knowledgeable."
In addition to these two theses stemming from the accountability
postulate, we also have the two claims discussed above stemming from the
knowledge proposition: the responsibility claim ("Because you should have
known better, you should be liable.") and the remedy claim ("Because you
should have known better, you should be liable for more."). Joining these
two theses with the two claims generates four combinations.
In specifying the first two combinations, notice how these two theses
of the accountability postulate tend to track the two claims of the
knowledge proposition. Putting together the threshold thesis and the
responsibility claim amounts to this: "Because you should have known
better, you acted reprehensibly in circumstances in which we would not
blame the less knowledgeable, and therefore you should be liable when the
less knowledgeable would not be." This will be called the extended
responsibility claim. Putting together the magnitude thesis and the remedy
claim: "Because you should have known better, you acted more
reprehensibly than would be ourjudgment of the less knowledgeable, and
therefore you should be liable for more." This will be called the extended
remedy claim."'
91. Nozick runs together the two claims in his framework for retribution: "The punishment
deserved depends on the magnitude H of the wrongness of the act, and the person's degree of
responsibility r for the act, and is equal in magnitude to their product, r x H.. The degree of
responsibility r varies between one (full responsibility) and zero (no responsibility) .... . NOZICK,
supra note 38, at 363. While the implicit baseline for his model suggests that a person's responsibility
may be diminished, the baseline for the knowledge proposition suggests that it may be enhanced
beyond the usual. Perhaps Nozick would account for this in determining "the wrongness of the act."
Id. at 386.
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The last two combinations of the two theses and claims are seemingly
less commonly encountered in the everyday world. First, the magnitude
thesis and the responsibility claim: "Because you should have known
better, you acted more reprehensibly than would be our judgment of the
less knowledgeable, and therefore you should be liable." We can imagine
situations in which this assertion may well be invoked. When, for example,
the law in question establishes a particular minimum level of
blameworthiness as a requisite to liability, this assertion would support the
point that this particular agent surpassed the minimum in circumstances in
which the unknowledgeable would not have. The mental element in
common law fraud, generally elevated above the blameworthiness
triggering the contract remedy for misrepresentation, 2 provides a possible
instance. Second, the threshold thesis and the remedy claim: "Because you
should have known better, you acted reprehensibly in circumstances in
which we would not blame the less knowledgeable, and therefore you
should be liable for more." Again, we can imagine the invocation of this
assertion. For example, under strict liability blameworthiness is not
relevant to whether the actor is liable, so this assertion may be advanced to
argue for a more generous measure of damages, perhaps even punitive
damages. Because I believe the additional analysis of these two combina-
tions of theses and claims will not significantly contribute to the discussion
that follows, and the additional complexity may well bring confusion, they
will not be pursued in the text.
To reconnoiter, the analysis of the knowledge proposition has led most
prominently, and somewhat tortuously, to the extended responsibility claim
and the extended remedy claim.93 Implicit in the analysis are normative
intuitions. In the next section, I explicate and justify some of these intu-
itions.
IV. THE MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS
There are three prominent Western, secular moral traditions in the legal
literature: the idea of corrective justice, originally derived from Aristotle's
work; the deontological centrality of duties, first systematically developed
in Kant's writings; and the teleological concern for good consequences,
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. a(1981) ("[A ln assertion need not
be fraudulent to be a misrepresentation. Thus a statement intended to be truthful may be a
misrepresentation because of ignorance or carelessness .... ); KEETON ET AL., supra'note 3. at 748-49
(explaining that, while strict tortious responsibility for misrepresentations is found in some instances,
it is usually in the context of contractual relationships).
93. See supra pp. 28-30.
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best known from Bentham's advancement of utilitarianism. While
corrective justice is deontological in its emphasis on proper actions (that is,
it is means-regarding), rather than the teleological emphasis on good
consequences (ends-regarding), I will examine the knowledge proposition
separately through the lenses of corrective justice and Kantian deontology
because of their historically distinct development and independent
influence. But first, to situate the three traditions, I will provide a sketch
of moral theory.
Under one representative interpretation of the version of corrective
justice first explored by Aristotle, the standard of liability is quite
straightforward. A person who harms another through blameworthy
conduct should compensate the other person commensurate with the
blameworthiness. 94 Kantian deontology is not as direct.95 It begins with his
94. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 48, at I 131 b-I 132b. This version ofcon'ective justice equates
with retributive justice. See Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pt.
2), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 9 (1983) [hereinaftler Coleman, Moral Theories Part I/l ("On the retributive
model, recovery and liability depend on the.injurer being morally at fault for the victim's damages.").
Or, perhaps, it equates with one version of retributive justice. See infra note 141. For other
interpretations ofAristotle's principle, see Jules L. Coleman, Correctivie Justice and Property Rights,
II SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 124, 127-35 (1994) (stating at page 127: "According to corrective justice,
individuals have a duty to repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible. Thus, any
conception of corrective justice requires conceptions of loss, wrongfulness, and responsibility.")
(stating at page 131: "Culpability is not a condition ofcorrectivejustice; responsibility is, however.");
and Christopher McMahon. The Paradox of Deontology, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 359-62 (1991)
(examining Aristotelian rectificatory justice). Under the common law tort system, in which the
tortfeasor must compensate the injured party to the extent of the injury irrespective of the degree of
the tortfeasor's fault or blameworthiness, the two conceptions ofjustice differ. See Coleman, Moral
Theories Part II, supra, at 9. ("That requirement [of moral fault] of the retributive view means it
cannot account for the principle of fault liability in torts which, though it requires fault, does not
require moral fault as a basis of liability."). Here, "[r]etributive justice and corrective justice cannot
be squared because corrective justice requires compensation front persons that exactly equals the
amount of harm they have caused; and this requirement will frequently cause suflering either more
than or less than retributively deserved, either absolutely or comparatively." Larry A. Alexander,
Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAw & PHIL. 1, 4 (1987). Some
commentators have expansive views of retribution that, like common law tort principles, take into
account the consequences of the improper act. See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau, Classification-Based
Sentencing: Sonte Conceptual and Ethical Problems, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 19. at 89, 102
(arguing that retributive criminal penalties "must be based on two basic retributive principles: (I ) the
severity of the punishment must be proportional to the gravity of the oftense, and (2) the gravity of the
offense must be a function of fault in the offender and harm caused the victim."); Jeffiey H. Reiman,
Justice. Civilization. aid the Death Penalr: Answering an den Hoag, 14 PHIL. & P1UlB. AFF. I15, 119
(1985) ("Retributivism ... is the doctrine that the offender should be paid back with suffering he
deserves because of the evil he has done, and the lex talionis [version of retributivism] asserts that
injury equivalent to that he imposed is what the offenderdeserves."). See generallI Jules L. Coleman,
Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limiits (pt. I), I LAW & PHIL. 371. 372-76 (1982)
(considering arguments that tort law "is best understood as rooted in principles ofcon-ectivejustice.").
Although corrective justice derives from Aristotle, the use of it to advance notions of responsibility
in tort law comes from George Fletcher in 1972. See Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles,
I I LAW & PHIL. 297, 301 (1992) (citing George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972)). While corrective justice is usually invoked today fur principles of tort
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categorical imperative in its various forms. His universalization principle
emerges from the first form under which a chosen act should satisfy a
maxim that applies to everyone without exception, including the agent.9
Under the second form of the categorical imperative, one is to treat all
people, worthy of respect as rational and therefore ethical beings, as ends
in themselves and not as means only to one's own ends. With these two
forms as the main guiding lights, an agent is to derive maxims of conduct
by means of rational consistency. 97 As examples, two primary maxims that
would emerge from Kantian reasoning relate to promise-keeping and truth-
telling. A person must always keep promises and tell the truth.
To complete the brief framework of moral theory, utilitarianism, which
stems from Bentham, is essentially consequentialist in its emphasis on
seeking good states of affairs in contradistinction to the deontological focus
liability, Aristotle also meant it to cover contract and restitution principles. See Stephen R. Perry, The
Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449,458 (1992). See generally Richard A. Posner,
The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of 7brt Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 191-201
(1981) (discussing and criticizing the correctivejustice theories of tort law of various commentators):
Symposium: Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Oiies One's Neighbors, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403 (1992) (providing discussion of historical and modern theories of corrective justice).
95. For a brief introduction to Kantian deontology, see BAILEY KUKLIN &JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 9-12 (1994). Michael Moore points out that in corrective justice, like
Kantianism, "moral desert plays the crucial justificatory role: tort sanctions arejustified whenever the
plaintiff does not deserve to suffer the harm uncompensated and the defendant by his or her conduct
has created an unjust situation that merits corrective action." Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS. sup/a note 89. at 179, 182.
96. See generally J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 83-102 (1977).
97. The mandate ofdeontological justice may be generalized this way: "ro each according to
X, from each according to Y." The X is broadly characterized as "desert." Of the six or more
conceptions of personal desert found in recent analyses ofjustice, three commonly championed ones,
"to each according to his or her virtue," "to each according to his or her effort," and "to each according
to his or her contribution," relate to blameworthiness in the sense discussed. See Diana T. Meyers,
hltroduction, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1, I (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1985). Each
criterion has its pros and cons. See id. at 1-2. For more on the conceptions of desert, see CH.
PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 6-1I, 56 (1963); NICHOLAS
RESCHER. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 73-83 (1966): and N. Scott Arnold. Why Profits Are Deserved, 97
ETHICS 387, 389-94 (1987). For challenges to the application of notions of desert, see HENRY
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 283-90 (Dover Publications 1966) (7th ed. 1907); and Robert
Young, Egalitarianism and Personal Desert, 102 ETHICS 319. 320 (1992). For the inadequacy of'the
notion of desert, see LUCAS, supra note 5, at 260-61; GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987); and J. L.A. Garcia,
Two Concepts of Desert, 5 LAW & PHIL. 219, 220 (1986). Sher points out in conclusion that desert is
not the sole basis of community justice determinations: "'[H]ow well a society promotes what is
deserved is not the only' thing that determines its justice. Also required, at a minimum, is that it treat
its citizens equitably, safeguard their basic rights (whatever those ultimately are)', and provide an
adequate range of opportunity for all." SHER, supra, at 210.
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on proper conduct.9" For Bentham, the good is happiness." Bentham's
version of the utilitarian mandate is often acclaimed: one is to seek the
most happiness for the most people.""' Now, we move to the two extended
uses of the knowledge proposition.
A. The Extended Responsibility Claim
Under the extended responsibility claim, the knowledge proposition
argues for finding liability in circumstances when it would otherwise not
be due: "Because you should have known better, you acted reprehensibly
(that is, in a blameworthy manner) in circumstances in which we would not
blame the less knowledgeable, and therefore you should be liable when the
less knowledgeable should not be." Corrective justice, Kantianism and
utilitarianism support this.' 0
First, corrective justice, in its modem legal incarnations, generally
justifies the extended responsibility claim. Tort and criminal liability
usually turn on fault or blameworthiness. "'2 Exceptions include the areas
of the law encompassed by strict liability, in which blameworthiness is
irrelevant.' Liability for breach of contract is essentially strict." 4
98. For a modern criticism and reconstruction of utilitarianism, see UTII.ITARIANISM AND
BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
99. See BENTHAM, suipr note 10, at 11-13. Other conceptions of rthe Good include pleasure,
vir-tue, knowledge, love, and preference satisfaction. See. e.g., W.D. Ross. THE RIGHT ANDTHEGOOD
140-41 (1930). See generally RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 332-52 (1959) (discussing
knowledge, love, the desire to be remembered afterdeath, and character traits, inter alia, as intrinsically
valuable).
100. See BENTHAM, supra note 10, at I 1-13.
101. Parallel moral arguments can be raised against the plaintiffwho is denied recovery on the
ground that she assumed the risk because she should have known better. Curiously there are situations
in which one will not be denied recovery despite having "known better," as when a wornan seeks
equitable distribution following the divorce from a person she should have known was an unreliable.
philandering, ne'er-do-well. Other policies dominate here.
102. See HOLMES, supra note 3, at 116-29 (arguing that, in general, the law of torts determines
liability by blameworthiness.); KEETON ET AL.. supra note 3. at 21-23. Although legal fault and moral
blameworthiness or fault diverge, see id. at 22, there is still moral justification for the notion of legal
fault, see NEIL MACCORMICK, Tie Obligation of Reparation, in LEGAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY 212, 221-27 (1982).
103. See. e.g., H.L.A. HART, Prolegontenon to the Principles of Punishtent. in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY, suipra note 14, at I, 20 ("ISltrict liability is generally viewed with great odium
and admitted as an exception to the general rule, with the sense that an important principle has been
sacrificed to secure a higher measure of'conflormity and conviction of offender>."); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 22-23; LLICAS, supra note 44, at 240 (noting that, in detending strict liability, "always
we f'eel that Justice is being sacrificed, and often ... to an unwarranted extent."). For the "classic"
justifications for strict liability, see William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consuner), 69 YALE L.J. 1099. 1114-24 (1960). One commentator finds that the law's recent
"infatuation" with strict liability reflects its immaturity, but that now "fault's true position at the center
of tort law is becoming clearer by the day." David G. Owen, 7Te Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 704
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Similarly, Epstein's take on corrective justice imposes a strict tort
standard." 5 But Aristotle's version of corrective justice and most modem
tort versions are consistent with the extended responsibility claim. As
noted, under corrective justice the key to liability is blameworthiness.
Because the knowledgeable person is blameworthy in circumstances in
which unknowledgeable persons would not be, this person who should have
known better should be liable when the others should not be.' 
06
Aristotle suggests that a person is liable for at least some of the ensuing
harm however slight the blameworthiness. To put the basic idea in modem
economic terms, in tort law, under the "Hand formula", a blameworthy act
essentially is one that is inefficient, that is, one in which the burden on the
actor in taking adequate precautions is less than the gravity of the risk to
third parties. °7 If the agent should have known that her conduct was
inefficient-even though others less knowledgeable would not have
known-then she should be liable irrespective of whether the others should
be liable. But Aristotle would probably not embrace the economic analysis
of blameworthiness,' °8 though he may well get to the same conclusions via
a different route. Aristotle was a deontologist concerned with proper
behavior, not a teleologist centralizing good consequences. The economic
(1992). On the other hand, there is more overlap between negligence and strict liability than is gen-
erally acknowledged. See J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1683-84 (1990)
(reviewing JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)). See generall/y Jules'L. Coleman, The
Morality of Strict Tori Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976) (discussing whether the strict
liability standard is unjust); Ernest J. Weinrib, Liberty. Community. and Corrective Justice, in
LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 290, 304-14 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991)
(analyzing the impact of strict liability on individual liberty).
104. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 346(1) (1981) ("The injured party has a right
to damages for any breach by a party against whom the contract is enforceable unless the claim for
damages has been suspended or discharged."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 12.8, at 784; JOHN E.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 673 (3d ed. 1990).
105. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION
OF TORT LAW (1980) (positing reform of tort law from its present location of liability in defendants'
fault to a system of'strict liability).
106. To put it succinctly, "[Ilault implies choice which in tum implies foreseeability." Banks
McDowell, ForeseeabilirI- in Conti-act and Tort: The Problems of Responsibilit" ad Remoteness, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 286, 324 (1986).
107. See United States v. Carroll Towing C'o., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In this case,
Learned Hand found the standard of negligence to tum on whether the probability of the risk o' a
consequential harm (P) times "the gravity of the resulting injury" (L) is greater than "the burden of
adequate precautions" (B). Id. at 173. Hence negligence (or contributory negligence) occurs when
B < PL.
108. But see Posner, stipra note 94, at 188 ("[Tlhe article argues that the Aristotelian concept
[of corrective justice] is compatible with, and indeed required by, the economic theory of tort and,
incidentally, contract and criminal law.").
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analysis of law largely springs from utilitarian reasoning."' 9 To Aristotle,
proper behavior is that which follows the dictates of moral virtue. Moral
virtue, to him, is the rational control of desires, which requires the
following of the mean."' It is a character trait necessary for individuals to
flourish."' To leap directly to the conclusion, since argument seems
109. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, Some Notes on the Economic Interpretation of Histor)', in FREEDOM
AND REFORM 246, 251 at n.4 (1947) ("[U]tilitarianism and pragmatism virtually reduce all ethics to
economics."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (1972) ("Bentham's
utilitarianism, in its aspect as a positive theory of human behavior, is another name for economic
theory."). But see Jules L. Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE
LAW 83 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (challenging the connection between
economics and utilitarianism); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103.(1979) ("The important question is whether utilitarianism and economics are really
the same thing. I believe they are not .... "). But the economic analysis of law could also be
constructed on deontological reasoning. Itf forexample, all members of society agreed to the adoption
of the economic analysis of law, then, because of the unanimous consent, Kant's respect tor personal
autonomy and the maxim of promise- keeping would justify its use. Because there is no such actual
contract, a social contract theorist might construct a hypothetical one that supports the economic
analysis of law. See, e.g., POSN9R, supra note 48, at 92-99. Cf Richard A. Posner, Epstein 's Tort
Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 460 (1979) (justifying a duty to rescue by a hypothetical
contract). But the meaningfulness of hypothetical consent in this context has been challenged. See.
e.g., Daniel Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 LAW & PHIL. 235 (1991 ) (arguing
that hypothetical consent has no moral force); Jules L. Coleman, Effieieic. Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 545-48 (1980) (arguing that hypothetical consent does not
work); Jules L. Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Anal'sis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posner 's The Economics ofJustice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1123-27 (1982) (arguing that hypothetical
consent is not economically efficient); Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Re.sponse to Professors
Calbresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 574-79 (1980) (arguing that Posner's idea of counter-
factual consent is really no consent at all but simply permits Posner to achieve the results he wants);
Mark SagofT, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHICS 301, 306-07 (1986) ("The difficulty with
hypothetical consent arguments of this sort is that there are so many of them."); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theoty, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307, 318-25 (1980) (discussing
hypothetical markets). Finally, normative economic theory can be justified on deontological,
libertarian principles of expanding individual liberty by deferring to the private choices driving the
invisible hand. See Robin P. Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights-The Need for
Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 164 (1986)
(placing Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman among those who favor the fiee market
for the sake of individual liberty).
I 0. Aristotle states: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean
(between two vices], i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by
that principle by which the man of'practical wisdom would determine it." ARISTOTLE, supra note 48,
at I 106b-1 107a. Virtue, according to Pindar, like a vine, is a product of both nature and nurture: It
"must be of good stock if it is to grow well. And even if it has a good heritage, it needs fostering
weather ... as well as the care of'concerned and intelligent keepers, 'or its continued health and full
perfection." MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS I (1986).
11l. See PHILIPPA FOOT, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
MORAL. PHILOSOPHY I (1978) (discussing.the characteristics at virtues); STEI'HEN R. MUNZER, A
THEORY OF PROPERTY 121-25 (1990) (stating at page 121: "A virtue is a more or less abiding character
trait that disposes a person to think or act in ways that are generally beneficial both for the person
having the trait and for others, and that either enhances some positive feature or correcis or modifies
some shortcoming of'human beings."); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory
" 
and Abortion, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 223, 225-33 (1991) (stating at page 226: "A virtue is a character trait a human being needs
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unnecessary, it is not virtuous to knowingly put others at substantial risk,
especially when the burden of precaution is less than the gravity of the risk
(in which case, the behavior is inefficient! "').
Once we divorce corrective justice from Aristotle's grounding of it in
the advancement of virtue, as has been done in modem times, the need
arises to reconceptualize why "knowing better" makes chosen acts more
blameworthy. Certainly the proposition is intuitively resonant that, the
more one knows better, the more one is blameworthy for nonetheless
choosing harmful or risky conduct contrary to one's better knowledge.'"
3
If, indeed, this does reflect society's intuitions, this is enough, according
to Durkheim, to explain society's instincts to punish the behavior." 4
Perhaps the proposition is a moral primitive. 5 Even Kant, who, we might
to flourish or live well."). For a list of the Aristotelian virtues that correspond to the major spheres of
experience, including courage, moderation,justice, generosity, and truthfulness, see Martha Nussbaum,
Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 242,246 (Martha N ussbaum
& Amartya Sen eds., 1993). In recent times, several philosophers have championed "virtue ethics."
See. e.g., Ruth Anna Putnam, Reciprocity and Virtue Ethics, 98 ETHICS 379, 379 (1988). "Moderate
proponents of virtue ethics proposed it on the grounds that without attention to the virtues we cannot
do justice to the complexity of our moral lives." Id(. at 380.
112. This is the reasoning that leads Posner to conclude that the Aristotelian theory ofcorrective
justice "is not only compatible with, but required by, the economic theory of law." Posner, supra note
94, at 201. But to get to this conclusion, Posner must expand Aristotle's conception ol"wrongful"
conduct. See id. at 201-06. While Weinrib,pmong others, is critical of Posner's analysis, he advances
a justification of the Hand formula under a Kantian interpretation of corective justice. See ErneSt J.
Weinrib, Towarda Moral Theoar ofNegligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 44-45, 53-54 (1983). In sum,
"[t]he balancing of the risk against the measures needed to eliminate or avoid the risk stands at the
junction of the paradigmatically deontological elements of rationality in a hypothetical situation and
equality as between actor and victim." Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).
113. Gross asserts this bald principle when developing the dimension of culpability that meas-
ures the dangerousness of conduct: "Culpability is affected by what the actor knows (or should know)
about the likelihood of harm on a particular occasion." HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 80 (1979). Thus, "if the actor knew (or should have known) when he acted that there was a
greater likelihood of harm than normal expectations would indicate, according to the same principle,
the culpability of his conduct is greater." Id.
114. Hart explains Durkheim's view. According to Durkheim, "punishment is 'a passionate re-
action of graduated intensity' to offences against the collective conscience." H.L.A. HART, Social
Solidarit" and the Enforcement of Morality, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 3, at 248, 255 (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 96 (George
Simpson trans., The Free Press 1933) (I 926)). Therefore, as Hart understands Durkheim, punishment
is "a symbolic expression of the outraged common morality." HART, supra, at 255. To put it in terms
of"responsibility," Plamenatz first observes that "th[is] term is used loosely." Plamenatz,supra note
44, at 187. The term is used so loosely that some suggest "that the difference between actions for
which we do, and actions for which we do not, hold one another responsible are to be looked for, not
in our situations and mental conditions when we act, but in our customary reactions to behaviour."
Id. "The sceptics who say this no doubt exaggerate, but just how much I do not know." Id.
I 15. Under intuitionism, a moral primitive is a claim that "is a primitive and unanalyzed pro-
position which is morally ultimate. Every ethical theory necessarily involves at least one such
primitive (e.g., 'happiness is good,' 'freedom is to be respected,' etc.) . J..." .EFFRIE G. MURPHY,
Three Mistakes About Retribittivisin, in RETRIBUTION, JUISTICE, AND THERAPY. supra note 88, at 77,
77.
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suppose, ties the censure of blameworthiness to the categorical imperative,
or directly to reason, instead denounces the proposition virtually as a
given.'" In the end as in the beginning, everyone knows that acts done
despite "knowing better" are worse. Period. No footnote needed.
Second, Kantian reasoning also supports the extended responsibility
claim. Because virtually all conduct creates at least attenuated risks to
others, acting with this general awareness is not using the others as a means
only to one's own ends. Everyone shares these reciprocal risks and
rationally accepts them as a cost of living in a dynamic world. "7 What real
choice do we have? Against an agent who is reasonably ignorant of the
potential of her act to put another at substantial risk, it is hard to claim that
she is using the other as a means only to her own end. Her ignorance may
prevent awareness that another person is being "used" at all. To choose
116. In lecturing on "degrees of responsibility," Kant expresses his thesis in terms of freedom,
which I have skirted in order to avoid the quagmire awaiting those who argue in terms of freewill and
determinism. Cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 112 (1986) ("1 change my mind about
the problem of free will every time I think about it, and therefore cannot offer any view with even
moderate confidence; but my present opinion is that nothing that might be a solution has yet been
described."); Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 960 ("Concessions to determinism are as inevitable as they
are perilous: they are steps down a slope that, despite enormous philosophical effort, remains a slippery
one."); Schoeman, supra note 89, at 302 ("Philosophers, and social theorists in general, have yet to
come up with a general account of what kinds of interferences with an individual undermine moral
accountability."). Nevertheless, the knowledge proposition is implicit in some of Kant's thoughts. He
begins by declaring that "[the degree of responsibility depends on the degree offreedom. Freedom
involves capacity to act, and in addition, cognizance of the impulsive ground and objective character
of the action." KANT, supra note 83, at 62. He soon thereafter asserts: "The greater the obstacles to
action which we must overcome, the more accountable we are for the action .... Id. at 62-63. Lest
there be any doubt, he restates the idea: "The more I have to force myself to do an action, the more
obstacles I have to overcome in doing it, and the more wilf'ully I do it, the more it is to be accounted
to me...." Id. at 63. Conversely, "the greater the fight a man puts Lip against his natural inclinations
the more it is to be imputed to him for merit." Id. The same is said about overcoming external forces.
See id. This is a matter of merit and demerit. See id.; see also JOEL FEINBERG, C'ausing Voluntar'
Actions. in DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 5, at 152, 171 ("When the trigger-pull [for an action]
is easy, . . . then the major part of the explanation of that action will necessarily involve the agent's
own complicated self; and the more the triggering diminishes in explanatory significance, the less
reluctant we are to regard the act as voluntary.") This is not the only place Kant makes such bald
assertions. In giving content to the formal principles of practical reason, one of Kant's questionable
attempts, according to Wolff, "is simply to assert without argument that there are two objective or
'obligatory' ends, namely the happiness of others and my own perfection." ROBERT PAUL WOLFF,
UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 111 (1977). Speaking of' freewill and determinism, for interesting
observations about the debate that relate to the theme of this article, see MOORE, supra note 13, chs.
9-10 (examining the question whether the recognition of the unconscious leads to the conclusion that
agents arc more responsible or less responsible and coming to a negative conclusion); and JEFFRIE G.
MLIRPHY. Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopath, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY,
supra note 88, at 128, 132 (asserting, under one compatibilist view of determinism, that "a responsible
man is not one whose behavior was uncaused but, rather, one whose behavior was caused by normal
or typical causes of behavior (desires, volitions, beliefs, etc.) and not by abnormal or atypical causes
(epileptic seizures, blows on the head, etc.)").
117. This analysis draws on Fletcher's theory of tort liability based on nonreciprocal risks. See
Fletcher, supra note 94. at 543-56.
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rationally to conform to a universalized maxim requires sufficient know-
ledge for one to judge whether one's conduct threatens to violate the
maxim. But to act when one knows or should know that one's conduct puts
another person at substantial risk, smacks, in the absence of that person's
consent, of a violation of the categorical imperative. This is particularly
the case when, under the Hand formula, the burden on the actor of adequate
precautions is less than the gravity of the risk to third parties. The agent
avoids inconvenience to herself when she has reason to know that her act
will impose probabilistically greater inconvenience or harm on others. If
everyone did this, it seems that most, if not all, rational conceptions of an
orderly society would be thwarted. The actor pursues a personal goal in a
manner that uses others only as a means.
Finally, utilitarianism buttresses the extended responsibility claim.
Under this moral viewpoint, a person's choices are to be aimed at
maximizing utility. Conduct that leads to antisocial or illegal consequences
presumably does not maximize utility. After all, for the utilitarian, it is
incumbent on society to establish standards of antisocial and illegal
conduct based on the mandate to maximize utility. Therefore, virtually by
tautology, once such standards are properly established, an antisocial or
illegal act runs afoul of the utilitarian precept.' 8 To a utilitarian, the very
notion of conduct subject to "blame" means that one has acted in a manner
that fails to abide by the precept.
Under utilitarianism, it is better to avert conduct that fails to maximize
utility, whether or not the actor is aware of the potential utility loss. This
increases overall welfare, but one can hardly be expected to choose to act
properly if one is unaware of the possible adverse consequences. To
accommodate this brute fact, some utilitarians espouse an expected, rather
than an actual, utility standard. One is to maximize expected utility. The
118. I write "virtually by tautology" in recognition of some of the famous hypotheticals that have
been mustered against utilitarian reasoning. One is about the sheriffwho turns over to a lynch mob
a prisoner known to her to be innocent in order to prevent a destructive riot. See Judith Lichtenberg,
The Right. the All Right. and the Good. 92 YALE L.J. 544,546 (1983) (reviewing SAMUEL SCHEFFLER,
THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS
UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS (1982)). While the sherift's conduct is illegal, it may
indeed satisfy the utilitarian mandate by avoiding greater disutility from the riot. So much the worse
for utilitarianism, according to the deontologists, and so much the worse for always equating antisocial
or illegal acts with antiutilitarian conduct.
119. See BRANDT, supra note 99, at 381-84; Frederic Schick. Lnder Which Descriptions?, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 98, at 251, 251-52. Bill see ROSs, supra note 99, at 43
(explaining that utilitarianism "says what is right is certain acts, not certain acts motivated in a certain
way; and it says that acts are never right by their own nature but by virtue of the goodness of their
actual results."). Because of the difference'between actual and expected consequences, G.E. Moore
draws the distinction between what is right and wrong, based on actual consequences, and what is
morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, based on expected consequences. See G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 80-
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extended responsibility claim clearly fits the expected utility standard. The
reason an actor should have known better, and therefore be liable, is that
she should have expected her conduct to fail to maximize utility. Yet, the
extended responsibility claim also fits the more exacting utilitarian
standard based on avoiding adverse consequences regardless of whether
they are expected. Conduct that one knows or should know will lead to
adverse consequences is likely to be more harmful, or harmful more often,
than conduct about which the actual consequences are unknown.' 2" Even
beyond this, the parties' awareness that an actor knowingly threatens them
with risky behavior is, in itself, harmful to them (that is, psychically
disruptive) irrespective of whether the adverse consequences actually
eventuate. 12
Related to the principle of criminal and civil deterrence is the idea, first
espoused by Calabresi, that the imposition of the duty to avoid risks on the
person in the best position to do so will also increase overall social welfare
by reducing waste. 2 2 The knowledgeable actor is more likely to be in a
better position than other parties to appreciate the risks, do a cost-benefit
analysis of them, and avoid them more cheaply or bribe another party to do
so. 123 In light of the principle of risk avoidance, the knowledgeable actor
should have known better than to proceed in the face of the risks known to
her.
In sum, the utilitarian, like the Aristotelian and deontologist, has much
to say in favor of the extended responsibility claim. We will see if they
have as much to say in favor of the extended remedy claim.
83 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965)(1912).
120. Hume, who has been read as being essentially a utilitarian, suggests this analysis. "Men
are less blam'd for such evil actions, as they perform hastily and unpremeditately, than for such as
proceed from thought and deliberation. For what reason?... because a hasty temper, tho' a constant
cause in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character." DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 412 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.. Oxford Univ. Press 1888) (1739 & 1740).
Notice that Hume links the relationship between blameworthiness and deliberation to the character of
the actor rather than the act.
121. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 6.6.6, at 484. Cf Eric Ashby. The Search .for an
Environental Ethic, in I THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES I, 18 (Sterling M. McMurrin
ed., 1980) (stating that "people will accept a voluntary risk considerably greater than an involuntary
risk").
122. Calabresi's more complete statement of the principle is: "A pure market approach to
primary accident cost avoidance Would require allocation of'accident costs to those acts or activities
(or combinations of them) which could avoid the accident costs most cheaply." CALABRESI, supra
note 15, at 135.
123. See id. at 135-40.
[Vol. 48
You SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER
B. The Extended Remedy Claim
Under the extended remedy claim, the knowledge proposition argues
for a more severe sanction than should be imposed on the unknowledgeable
actor: "Because you should have known better, you acted more reprehen-
sibly (that is, in a more blameworthy manner) than would be our judgment
of the less knowledgeable, and therefore you should be liable for more."
Again, corrective justice, Kantianism and utilitarianism generally support
this.
First, Aristotle's vision of corrective justice warrants the extended
remedy claim. Recall that, under Aristotle's version, a person who harms
another through blameworthy conduct should compensate the other person
commensurate with the blameworthiness. '24 The extended responsibility
claim, discussed above, addresses the left side of the equation: an actor
should compensate another person when her blameworthy conduct harms
him. 12  The extended remedy claim addresses the right side of the
equation: the measure of the required compensation is the degree of the
blameworthiness. In this context, completing the equation is quite straight-
forward. Because knowingly putting another at risk is more blameworthy
than acting from relative ignorance, the remedy according to Aristotle
should be increased to reflect the greater fall from virtue. '2 1 Similarly,
harmful conduct when an actor is in a position to know she is putting
another at risk is more blameworthy than harmful conduct when she is not
in such a position.' 27
The modem versions of corrective justice generally manifested in
common law tort principles diverge from Aristotle's. Whereas Aristotle
would have the actor, in both criminal and tort suits, compensate the
harmed person in proportion to the ascribed blameworthiness, ',_8 current tort
law generally declares that, once the actor surpasses the established
threshold of fault (roughly "blameworthiness"), the actor is to compensate
the harmed person to the full extent of her harm. 29 It therefore seems that,
once recovery is allowed, the knowledge proposition is not invocable
pursuant to the extended remedy claim to justify an increase in the harmed
person's recovery because it is superfluous.
124. See suipra note 94 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part IV.A.
126. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
129. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 377 (2000).
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But there is another line of authority more akin to Aristotle's view of
corrective justice that sheds light on this issue. The rule that the negligent
actor is liable to the harmed person for the full extent of her harm is what
Hart and Honor6 call the "narrow view" of the role of foreseeability in the
law of negligence: "The narrow view ... is that the foreseeability of harm
is relevant to whether the defendant was negligent but not to the extent of
his responsibility once negligence is shown.""" Opposed to this is the
wider view that also considers foreseeability at a second stage of the
inquiry. Under this alternative view, "the foreseeability of harm is relevant
also to the extent of a negligent defendant's responsibility."'' Taking this
at face value, it ties neatly to the extended remedy claim. Insofar as an
agent foresees or should foresee the consequences of a contemplated
action, she should be liable for the consequent harm. 32  An unusual
consequence will not cut off the liability of the agent who should have
130. HART & HONORE, supra note 8, at 255. Compare the doctrine of the plaintiff with the
"eggshell skull," whereby a tortfeasor must take her victim as she finds him. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 290 ("(A] defendant who is negligent must take existing circumstances as they are, and
may be liable for consequences brought about by the defendant's acts, even though they were not
reasonably to be anticipated.").
13 1. HART & HONORE, slipro note 8, at 255. Hart and F-onore cite for this view, along with
some commentators. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Moris Dock & Eug'g Co. (The Wagon Mound
No. /). 119611 App. Cas. 388 (P.C. Aust.) (appeal taken from Australia). See generall" Ernest J.
Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHi-KENT L. REv. 407.438-44 (1987) (discussing whether
a defendant can be held liable Ior unforeseeable consequences or to unl'oresceable plaintiffs).
132. Coleman questioned whether correctivejustice always calls for compensation by the actor
to the injured party. Because the actor does not "gain" firom many torts, for example, automobile
accidents, Coleman stated that first or third party insurance coverage would satisfy the compensation
requirement. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 187-88. But "[a] no-fault allocation of
losses owing to intentional torts involving gain would not nullify the wrongdoer's gain and would be
objectionable on those grounds." Id. at 188. Yet generally, Coleman asserted, correetive justice itself
does not require compensation from the wrongdoer to the injured party. See Coleman, Moral Theories
Part I, supra note 94, at 11 -14 (discussing the grounds and modes of rectification). Weinrib criticizes
Coleman's (and others') analysis by observing that correctivejustice, as Aristotle conceived it, requires
a correlation between the victim's injury and the wrongdoer's obligation, as well as a necessary
relation between the parties; that is, the wrongdoer must actually compensate the victim. See Weinrib,
supra note 13 , at 438-44; see also Stephen R. Perry, Colmlent on Coleman: (orrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 381 (1992) (concluding that Coleman's theory is essentially based on distributive justice, not
corrective justice); Jeremy Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law. 99 YALE L.J. 1441,
1450-54 (1990) (reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, ANDTHE LAW (1988)) (criticizing
Coleman's dissociation in corrective justice of victim's injury and wrongdoer's obligation). At first
Coleman rejected Weinrib's argument. see Jules L. Coleman, Property. Wrongfhtiess and the Duty
to Copnpeunsate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45i (1987), but hc has largely come to concede the points of
Weinrib and Perry, see Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception oJ('orrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 427, 433-34 (1992), though not enough to fully satisfy Weinrib, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-
Relational Relationships: A Note on Coleman's New l' heo, 77 IOWA 1L. REV. 445 (1992).
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known better than to doubt the reasonable possibility of a linkage from act
to harm. 33
In the same way, contract law supports the extended remedy claim.
While the liability itself for breach of contract is inconsistent with the
extended responsibility claim because contract liability is generally strict,
the allowable remedy for breach turns on the foreseeability of the harm by
the breacher at the time of contracting.'3 4  Like the wider view of
foreseeability in the law of negligence, if the breacher should have foreseen
the unusual harm to the aggrieved party, she should compensate the
aggrieved party for it.'35
Second, Kantianism justifies the extended remedy claim. At first
blush, this claim may seem to fit uncomfortably within the categorical
imperative. Kant, an absolutist, promotes duties as'either/or propositions.
Either one has a particular duty or one does not. There are no degrees of
duties. Instead there is, in principle, a complete, coherent network of exact
duties that all must always perform without exception. 36 The extended
remedy claim suggests degrees.3 7 The more one is blameworthy, the more
one must compensate harmed persons.
This initial analysis fails to distinguish properly the extended
responsibility claim from the extended remedy claim. As is evident in the
discussion above, duties are absolute under the responsibility claim: Do not
knowingly, or with reason to know, engage in antisocial or illegal
133. Hart and Honord discuss the wide view ol'foreseeability primarily in terms ofa limitation
on liability: "The wider view of the place of lbreseeability in the law of negligence may be formulated
thus: a defendant is responsible for and only for such harm as he could reasonably have tbreseen and
prevented." HART & HONORE. supra note 8, at 255 (emphasis added). But they recognize that it is an
extension as well as a limitation on liability: "[T]he extending doctrine is that [the delendant] is liable
for foreseeable harm of which his act is a necessary condition even it: on common-sense causal
principles, he did not cause it." Id. at 256. This extension supports, like Aristotle's version of
corrective justice, the extended liability of the knowledgeable actor.
134. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 12.14, at 821-29; MURRAY, supra note 104, § 120, at
683-95. The leading case is, of course, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
135. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 106, at 323-24 (discussing the role of forseepbility in both
contract and tort law).
Whether the principles of contract damages are sufficiently supported by the notion of corrective
justice has been questioned. See. e.g., MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 25. at 192-93; Anthony T.
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice. 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
136. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 110, at 31-32; R.M. Hare, Moral Conflicts, in I THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, supra note 121. at 169, 179-80. For the difficulties in
determining the network of rights, see Joel Feinberg. Volnla:r Euthanasia and the hialienable Right
to Life. in I THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES,. upra note 12 1, at 221, 227-34.
137. Plamenatz concludes that since, at the time of a choice, people are affected in various de-
grees by the manifold influences on decisionmaking, l[ilt therefore makes sense to speak of degrees
of responsibility, and of diminished responsibility." Plamenatz. supra note 44. at 179.
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conduct. 3 ' The duty is not greater because the act is grossly improper." 9
Yet, once this general maxim is criminally violated, Kant would decree
punishment commensurate with the blameworthiness of the violation-
what the criminal deserves-as determined by the standard of retribution. 4'
Trespass is one thing, but murder is quite something else. Kant holds to
this difference whether the remedy sought is criminal or civil. Under
Kant's view of civil liability, as in one interpretation of Aristotle's version
of corrective justice, the wrongdoer should compensate the injured person
to the extent of the blameworthiness.
141
Bare retribution, however, calls for sanctions in a class of instances that
are nonremediable under the common law. When the actor's conduct is
138. See supra Part IV.A.
139. See id.
140. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (John Ladd trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965) (1797). Kant's guiding standards for punishment are "his renowned
principle of respect for persons and his insistence that only the 'Law of retribution' (jus talionis) could
determine the morally appropriate kind and degree of punishment." M. Margaret Falls, Retribution,
Reciprocity. and Respect for Persons, 6 LAW & PHIL. 25, 25 (1987). Kant does not champion
retribution as a "moral primitive," see supra note 115 (defining what is meant by "moral primitive").
but "[hle left it to later philosophers to identify the exact logical and moral connections between
respecting persons and returning suffering for suffering," Falls, supra. at 25. Murphy and others see
Kant's retribution as "based on his general view that political obligation is to be analyzed, quasi-
contractually, in terms of reciprocity." JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Marxism and Retribution, in
RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 93, 100. But see Falls, supra (criticizing the
theory of reciprocity and advancing the "moral accountability theory"). See generally JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY, Kant's Theoi
, 
of Criminal Punishment, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE. AND THERAPY, suipra. at
88; B. Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theot, of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat. Retribution in Its
Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151 (1989) (arguing that deteirence is also a facet of Kant's theory of
punishment); Don E. Scheid, Kant's Retriblitivism, 93 ETHICS 262 (1983) (arguing that Kant is not a
"thoroughgoing retributivist"). One relevant criticism of Kantian retribution is that the retributive
conception of "desert" remains unclear. See Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theor of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PLB. AFF. 208, 235-36 (1984). While few modern commentators agree with
Kant (and Hegel) that retribution "nullifies" the offense, retribution or punishment is often promoted
today as an authoritative expression of moral condemnation. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive
Function of Punishment. in DOING AND DESERVING, supra note 5, at 95-98; HART, supra note 19, at
230-37; RICHARDS, supra note 19. at 236 (referring to Bishop Butler's "thesis known as 'punishment
as the expression of public morality'). But see Michael Davis, Punishment as Language: Misleading
Analog), for Desert Theorists, 10 LAW & PHIL. 311 (1991) (arguing that the expressive theory
contributes nothing worthwhile to traditional retributivism); Moore, supra note 95, at 181 (asserting
that denunciatory theories of punishment are utilitarian, not retributive). Nozick sees retributive
punishment as "(re)connecting" the wrongdoer with corect values. See NOZICK, supra note 38, at 374.
141. See Weinrib, supra note 131, at 449 ("Kant's integrative interpretation of doing and
suffering under the concept of right itself has ancient roots, because it translated into the terms of his
metaphysics of morals Aristotle's pathbreaking elucidation of corrective justice."). One commentator
observes that there are three versions of retributive theory: an eye for an eye irrespective of intention
(the simplest); a tooth for a tooth for acts done intentionally or in character (Hume's and Adam
Smith's); and punishment to reciprocate for moral wickedness (the sophisticated, modern, and liberal
version). See Haksar. supra note 10. at 318. Haksar assigns Kant to this third version. See id. For
an argument that retribution is insufficient to justify the moral duty of reparation, see MACCORMICK,
stupra note 102, at 214-17.
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blameworthy, but no one is injured, the actor will be free of liability
however great her blameworthiness. For example, the scam operator who
passes off gold-plated bars as solid gold will not be liable to the deceived
purchasers when it turns out that the underlying metal is the more valuable
platinum. Attempted wrongdoing that fails is usually subject to no civil
sanction (or reduced criminal sanction) though the blameworthiness is not
diminished because the attempt fails. 42  In these circumstances, the
extended remedy claim diverges from the retributive theory of civil liability
because liability, extended or not, depends on an injury, whereas retributive
blameworthiness does not.
Furthermore, the essence ofthe retributive theory of punishment is that
a morally objectionable offense should be reciprocated by the imposition
of "pain or loss corresponding with the moral gravity of [the] offense." 4 '
The usual sense of "moral gravity" ties to blameworthiness or reprehen-
sibility, which take into account all the circumstances of the particular
action that reflect the character of the act or the actor.144 We say, akin to
the notion of corrective justice, 4 ' that the actor deserves punishment
commensurate with the blameworthiness.
46
142. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 183.
143. Richard B. Brandt. The Conditions of Criminal Responsibihitt. in RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 12, at 106, 106; see also NOZICK. supra note 38, at 363-97; Bcdau, siqwa note 94, at 102
(refen'ing to "two basic retributive principles: (I) the severity of the punishment Must be proportional
to the gravity of the offense, and (2) the gravity of the offense must be a flnction of fault in the
offender and harm caused the victim."); Moore, supra note 95, at 179-82 (defining and clarifying
"retributivism"); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules. 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955) (stating that, under
the retributive view of punishment, "[ilt is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer
in proportion to his wrongdoing.... [Tihe severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the
depravity of his act"). Feinberg points out that there are many distinct theories of-retributivism.". He
discusses the theories "that hold that a certain degree ofipain or deprivation is deserved by, or matches,
fits, or suits, a certain magnitude of evil, quite apart from consequences. The emphasis is on fitness
or proportion .... JOEL FEINBERG, Sua Culpa, in DOING AND DESERVING. s//p/a note 5, at 187.216
n.20. For Feinberg's examination of a retributive theory of torts, see id. at 217-21.
144. See Brandt, suipra note 143, at 107.
145. See ANTHONY KENNY, FREEWILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 70 (1978) ("The theory of retribu-
tive justice is an attempt to give an account of the justice of ajust punishment in terms of commutative
justice.").
146. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 113, at 414,438; (stating at page 414: "Once the primitive
idea of a harm for a harm is abandoned, the best measure of punishment seems to be the
blameworthiness of the conduct that is the basis of liability."). This proposition apparently aligns with
sentencing practices:
[Tlhe choice of sentence among alternatives available is influenced by (I) whether or not
the background and history of the offender reveal a pattern ot'criminality, and (2) whether
the facts sunounding the commission of the offence suggest a high level of culpability or
moral blameworthiness on the part of the offender.
John Hogarth, Magistrates ' World Views and Sentencing Behaviour, in PERCEPTION IN CRIMINOLOGY,
supra note 59, at 310, 315-16. While the first factor is consistent with the aim to punish for the
character of the actor, rather than the act, it is also consistent with detenence principles.
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At this point, as suggested above, the commentators divide on whether
retribution is to relate to the character of the actor or the character of the
act. In the context of the knowledge proposition, we might say that the
actor is more reprehensible because she should have known better than to
behave as she did, or we might say that the act was more reprehensible
because the actor should have known better than to have performed it, and
therefore, under either characterization, in accordance with the extended
remedy claim, she should be liable for more. While the modem view
favors punishment for acts, not personal character, '47 I will try to avoid this
issue since I believe the knowledge proposition stands essentially the same
irrespective of which way it is resolved. But, as is evident in prior discus-
sion, I have not avoided the controversy altogether. When I pondered the
person who through rationalization, carelessness, thoughtlessness, or
caprice ultimately re-forms her character in such a way as to make blame-
worthy choices easier, 48 I seemingly centralized character, not acts. But
even after this scenario, we can still conclude that the person should have
known better than to perform the particular act if we assume the period of
"knowing better" reaches back to the time before she had re-formed her
147. Bayles reports that the view that punishment is aimed at individual acts, not character, is
derived from Kantian retributivism. See Michael D. Bayles, Character. Purpose. and Criminal
Responsibility, I LAW & PHIL. 5, 6-7 (1982). But at one point Kant states that punishment is to be
based on a person's "inner viciousness," which smacks of moral character. See KANT, supra note 140,
at 102-04. The tradition that punishment is aimed at character stems from Home. See Bayles, supra,
at 7; supra note 120 (quoting Hume). For the modern position, see. tbr example, GROSS. supra note
113, at 452 ("[lIt is not part of the proper administration of criminal justice to make judgments about
who is truly a bad person and who is really not so bad."). Justice Scalia finds the Constitution to be
Humean: "Our cases proudly announce that the Constitution effectively prohibits the States from
excluding from the sentencing decision any aspect of a defendant's character or record, or an'
circumstance surrounding the crime: that the defendant had a poor and deprived childhood, or that he
had a rich and spoiled childhood .... " Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639. 663 (1990) (Scalia. J.,
concurring), quoted in Martha C. Nussbaum. Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & Putt. AFF. 83., 87 n. 10
(1993). Among the objections to determining whether a person deserves punishment because of
personal character is that such punishment "depends on perceiving the kind ofcharacter he or she has,"
and that it unrealistically "assume[s], with Aristotle, that people choose to develop the kind of
character they have." FLETCHER, supra note 9, § 10.3.2, at 805 (citation omitted). Limiting the legal
inquiry to the blameworthiness of particular acts "restricts the range of relevant information, but...
secures the individual against a free-ranging inquiry of the state into his moral worth." Id. at 801. On
the other hand, Parfit posits that, for example, the ninety-year-old winner of the Nobel Peace Prize may
not deserve punishment after confessing to injuring a policeman in a drunken brawl at the age of
twenty: "Just as someone's deserts correspond to the degree of his complicity with some criminal, so
his deserts now, for some past crime, correspond to the degree ofpsychological connectedness between
himself now and himself when committing that crime." DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 326
(1984); see also ROSS, supra note 99, at 58-59 (asserting that retributive punishment in proportion to
moral badness "should take account of the whole character of the persons involved," among other
things). For Aristotle's distinction between the moral assessment of'character and the praise or blame
of individual acts, see Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 278-79.
148. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
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character. She might not have known better when she chose to act, but she
should have known better based on her original channeling.' 49
Similarly, when the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages is
sought, the knowledge proposition again serves as a warrant for an
increased recovery pursuant to the extended remedy claim. Because the
main function of punitive damages is to exact punishment, 5 ' the
knowledge proposition plays a role in assessing this private remedy
comparable to its role in setting the level of a criminal sanction. The
factfinder'sjudgment of the degree of blameworthiness relevant to a retrib-
utive measure of extraordinary damages weighs what the defendant should
have known. It seems, then, that the extended remedy claim holds under
Kant in both the criminal and the civil contexts.
Both the extended responsibility and the extended remedy claims may
be supported by different reasoning under a modem approach to Kantian
morality, such as the one advanced by Rawls.' Both claims would argu-
ably be adopted as maxims by contracting parties in the original position
behind Rawls's veil of ignorance.'52 As I have been arguing,' both claims
advance efficiency, promote social welfare, and satisfy notions of justice.
By seeking their (hypothetical) unanimous consent to the claims, each
person is recognized as an autonomous, ethical being, thereby satisfying
Kantian mandates under the categorical imperative. '13
The original contracting parties would, upon reflection, take into
account the inherent difficulties and human weaknesses in decisionmaking
revealed by modem study. As discussed above,"' making choices,
especially under risk and uncertainty, is fraught with challenges even for
the most assiduous. At many points in the process of decisionmaking and
149. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
150. See KEETON ET AL., suipra note 3, at 9. See generally Kuklin, supra note 18.
151. For some of the Kantian features of Rawls's theory (and others), see Bernard Williams,
Persons, Character and Morality, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 197, 197-98 (Amelie Oksenberg
Rorty ed., 1976).
152. To prevent the founders ofajust society from embracing political principles favorable to
their own particular personal interests, Rawls places them in the original position behind a veil of
ignorance that filters out knowledge of their place in society, class, social status, personal abilities,
preferences, temperament, and so forth. See RAWLS, supra note 14, § 24.
153. Because consent to the claims is hypothetical, not actual, some commentators reject its
Kantian grounding. See. e.g., Dworkin, supra note 109. at 574-79; Onora O'Neill, Between
Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 252, 257 (1985) ("If'treating others as persons requires only
hypothetical rational consent, we may ... find ourselves oven'iding the actual dissent of others,
coercing them in the name of higher and more rational selves who would consent to what is
proposed."); David Schmidtz, Justifying the State, 101 ETHICS 89,97 (1990) ("[H lypothetical consent
cannot constitute justification; to suppose hypothetical consent is to presuppose justification.
Hypothetical consent proceedsfion teleological justification rather than to it.").
154. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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implementation, a range of complications arises, from the metaphysical and
epistemological to those springing from human shortcomings, such as the
warpings of cognitive dissonance and our tendency to rationalize. Without
further rehearsing the many difficulties that muddy the judgment of
whether a particular act violates the categorical imperative or, for that
matter, increases utility, it seems that the original parties could account for
the difficulties by adopting a maxim with a sliding scale. The clearer it is,
or should be, to the actor that her choice comprises a violation of society's
mandates, the more blameworthy it is. For various reasons, mainly admini-
strative, a minimum threshold on the sliding scale may be adopted as a
trigger for standard liability. ' But somewhere beyond the threshold, the
liability increases to reflect the supposedly greater certainty of the actor
that her chosen conduct is unacceptable. Thus, the sliding scale combines
the extended responsibility and remedy claims.
Finally, utilitarianism offers grounds for the extended remedy claim.
At first glance, it appears that a utilitarian would not back an increased
remedy. It seems that the damages are simply a wealth transfer from one
party to another that leaves overall utility unchanged, regardless of whether
the amount is increased because of the actor's heightened blameworthiness.
But society understandably opts to impose standard liability in order to
assure people that their endeavors will not be frustrated by the improper
behavior of others, thereby encouraging socially beneficial conduct that the
additional risk of loss would deter. Yet, once a harmed party is fully
compensated, what is to be gained by allowing her additional compensation
for the defendant's exacerbated malfeasance?
One answer, perhaps answer enough, comes from the recognition of the
administrative costs of the legal system. Despite the administrative costs,
society benefits overall from the deterrence of improper behavior. Because
it is difficult at the margins for an actor to determine whether the
contemplated conduct crosses the line, society, in order to avoid overly
cautious behavior,'5 will not penalize her beyond the amount necessary to
compensate the injured party and will itself absorb much of the admini-
strative costs. But once the actor knows or has reason to know that she is
155. Once a threshold is adopted, as mentioned in passing above, the knowledge proposition
leads to a possible combination of the magnitude thesis and the responsibility claim: "Because you
should have known better, you acted more reprehensibly than would be our judgment of the less
knowledgeable, and therefore you should be liable [when the less knowledgeable would not be
liable)." See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
156. For an argument that the uncertainty about whether particular conduct would cross the line
leads to cautious, inefficient behavior, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANAIYSIS OF LAW 543-44
(4th ed. 1992); and Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Pinitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1. 33-57, 63-71 (1982).
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beyond the line, there is no reason to be generous to this person who has
thrown caution to the wind while, at the same time, putting others at risk.
Indeed, at this point, for the sake of deterring others (general deterrence),
it is more beneficial to make the point that reckless behavior will be met by
the extended remedy claim. Punitive damages would certainly accomplish
such deterrence. When the act is criminal, enhanced criminal sanctions
would deter socially undesirable conduct too.
The deterrence of the actor who contemplates an improper act despite
knowing better (special deterrence) may also call for an extended remedy.
As Posner observes regarding premeditation, "[t]he criminal who premed-
itates is more likely to succeed in his criminal aim (and thus do more harm)
than the impulsive criminal, and the premeditator is also harder to appre-
hend and punish and therefore less likely to be punished. On both counts
effective deterrence requires a heavier punishment if he is caught.""'
Similarly, the premeditator who should know better may be more likely to
succeed and harder to apprehend and punish than other premeditators.'
This reasoning also applies to the deterrence of improper conduct of a
noncriminal nature.
Another utilitarian answer refers back to the prior observation that a
person's awareness that the actor improperly threatens her with risky
behavior is, in itself, harmful to her. Security being such a valued condi-
tion,"' it is psychically harmful to be knowingly put at risk, even if the risk
157. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 175 (1990).
158. Looking to the relationship between bare mens rea and deterrence. Kenny makes this point:
"The connection between the deterrent purpose ofpunishment and the necessity ofmens rea ifa crime
is to be imputed is made via the concept of practical reasoning: the attachment of penal sanction to
legislation is precisely an attempt to affect the practical reasoning of citizens." KENNY, supra note
145, at 79-80. Kenny goes on to apply this analysis to the greater punishment given to reckless killers
than to inadvertent ones. Reckless acts, he finds, are more dangerous than negligent ones: "[Alctions
which, for all one knows, may be dangerous are less dangerous than actions which one positively
knows to be a risk to life. Hence the more severe threat of punishment is held out to the citizen
contemplating the more dangerous action." I. at 89. He would further apply this analysis to
distinguish intentional killers from reckless ones: "[Ajctions done with the intention of causing death
are in general more dangerous than those merely foreseen as likely to cause death." Id. Presumably,
the next step would be to find acts done despite knowing better to be more dangerous than acts done
simply intentionally. Heightened penalties for the more dangerous acts enhance deterrence: "[it is
surely not a mere accident that the gradations of severity in punishment which a comparatively
recondite application of the theory of deterrence suggests should correspond in such large neasure
with the intuitions of moral common sense about the comparative wickedness of fiames of'mind." Id.
at 92.
159. One French legal philosopher elevates security to the supreme value protected by the law.
See Rene Demogue, Analysis of Fundanientnl Notions. in MODERN FRENCH LEGAL. PHILOSOPHY 345,
418-45 (Mrs. Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P. Chamberlain trans., 1916) (stating at page 418 "We touch
here the most important of the desiderata of social and legal life, its central motor, the need for
security."). John Stuart Mill "declares that the primary Object of moral rights is security, 'the most
vital of all interests,' 'the most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical nutriment.' 'the very
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does not eventuate.' In support of the remedy claim, full compen-sation
for this harm requires enhanced damages commensurate with the
blameworthiness of the conduct.
Overall, corrective justice, Kantian deontology, and utilitarian teleol-
ogy generally endorse both the extended responsibility and the extended
remedy claims derived from the knowledge proposition. The knowledge
proposition finds support not only in blind intuition, but also in the
enlightening structures of moral theory.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of the knowledge proposition, "you should have known
better," as implied by its common appearance in appropriate circumstances
in exchanges ranging from everyday conversation to judicial opinions,
evidently strikes a resonant chord with our deep intuitions. Since the
proposition uniformly appears as a bald assertion, itsjustification normally
remains at the level of bare intuition, as if it is self-evident. The aim of this
Article has been to unpack the meaning of the proposition and to see
whether justification for it is to be found in reason.
Various underlying postulates were uncovered along the analytical
trail: the channel postulate, the incentive postulate, the disposition
postulate, and the accountability postulate. Byways were also discovered
that eventually lead to the extended responsibility claim and the extended
remedy claim, among others. After traveling the more promising paths,
normative warrants for them were considered. Corrective justice, Kantian
deontology, and utilitarian teleology were all found to be generally sup-
portive. In the end, it seems that our deep intuitions embrace the
knowledge proposition because it is consistent with our developed moral
theories. Or perhaps it is the other way around.
groundwork of our existence."' Alan Gewirth, Can Utilitarianisn Justify Any Moral Rights?, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW, supra note 109. at 158, 174-75 (citing JOHN STUART MILL.
UTILITARIANISM 81 (I Oth ed.. Longmans, Green. and Co. 1888) (1863)).
160. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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